Appearance by the Minister of National Defence and Senior Officials, before: House standing committee on National Defence (NDDN) - Communications Security Establishment Canada

From: Communications Security Establishment Canada

Main Estimates (2020-2021)

Appearance details

Date: Monday November 2, 2020 (TBC)

Location: Meeting to be held virtually

Time: TBD

Appearing:

Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence
Jody Thomas Deputy Minister, National Defence
LGen Michael Rouleau Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, National Defence
Cheri Crosby Chief Financial Officer, National Defence
Troy CrosbyAssistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), National Defence
RAdm Genevieve Bernatchez Judge Advocate General, National Defence
Shelly Bruce Chief, Communications Security Estalishment

Details: The Minister of National Defence will appear alongside senior officials to speak on the Main Estimates, 2020-2021.

On September 30th, the President of the Treasury Board re-tabled the Main Estimates (2020-21) in the House for the new Parliamentary session. These Estimates were previously tabled in February 2020, but had not been approved or studied by committees due to COVID-19.

Issue notes

CSE general overview note

Communications Security Estalishment – Main Estimates, 2020-2021

The Communications Security Establishment plays a critical role in protecting Canada’s security, while safeguarding Canadians’ rights.
The Communications Security Establishment provides valuable foreign intelligence to inform the Government of Canada’s decision making and protect national security.
Its sophisticated cyber and technical expertise also helps identify, prepare for, and defend against threats to Canada and its cyber systems and networks.

Key facts

The Communications Security Establishment’s (CSE) Main Estimates are $711.8M, a net decrease of $21.2M from the 2019-20 Main Estimates.
The decrease in CSE’s Main Estimates can be attributed to:
- A decrease in planned funding because of the winding down of the construction and fit-up of the new facility for the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security ($7.8M),
- Decreased funding for two Cyber Centre projects ($10.3M),
- Decreased funding associated with changes in programs supporting CSE’s mandate ($3.5M); and
- Decreased funding for the Critical Cyber Systems initiative ($9.1M).
This decrease is partially offset by an increase in funding for three initiatives under the National Cyber Security Strategy ($9.5M).

Details

CSE’s 2020-21 Main Estimates are $711.8M, which includes $16.1M for revenues and $45.5M for statutory items.
This is a net decrease of $21.2M from the previous year’s Main Estimates of $733.0M, attributable to:
- A reduction of $7.8M in the planned funding profile for the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security as the construction and fit-up of the new Cyber Centre facility winds down.
- A decrease in funding of $10.3M for two Cyber Centre projects:
  - Sunset of $2.3M in funding for the Secure Communications for National Leadership (SCNL) project and
  - A decrease of $8.0M in the Phase Two funding for the Canadian Cryptographic Modernization Program (CCMP) as the project ramps down.
A net decrease of $3.5M associated with changes in other programs supporting CSE’s mandate, including:
- A planned reduction for internal services support for Maintaining the Government of Canada’s Information Technology Security Posture Initiative (Critical Erosion), which sought program integrity funding for the Information Technology Security Program (now part of the Cyber Centre); and
- A decrease in CSE’s costs associated with its staff located at liaison offices abroad because of a transition to Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) service model.
Finally, a decrease of $9.1M for the Critical Cyber Systems initiative – included in CSE’s 2019-20 Main Estimates through a Budget Implementation Vote – because the funding was not accessed due to a delay in the tabling of the necessary enabling legislation.
This decrease is partially offset by an increase of $9.5M for three initiatives under the National Cyber Security Strategy, provided to CSE in 2019-20 through a Budget Implementation Vote:
- Improved Integrated Threat Assessments ($3.6M)
- Expanding Advice and Guidance to the Finance and Energy Sector ($2.3M); and
- Interim Quantum Safe Capability ($3.6M).

5G/Telecommunications security

As part of its cyber security mandate, CSE works with telecommunications service providers representing over 99% of Canadian subscribers.
In this role, CSE provides advice and guidance to mitigate supply chain risks in telecommunications infrastructures upon which Canadians rely. This includes a program in place since 2013 to restrict the deployment of designated equipment from sensitive areas of the network and to test and evaluate designated equipment and services, including Huawei, considered for use in less sensitive areas of Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks.
The Government of Canada is currently reviewing its security approach to emerging 5G technology.

COVID-19

Cyber threat actors are attempting to take advantage of Canadians’ heightened levels of anxiety around COVID-19.
That is why CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security are working in coordination with industry partners to take action against malicious cyber actors and fraudulent sites before they can take advantage of Canadians. This work is resulting in the removal of a number of malicious sites, including over 3,500 sites and email addresses that have spoofed the Government of Canada (as of mid-October 2020).
Canadians need to be able to trust official Government of Canada sources during this challenging time for our country and CSE is taking action to ensure they can.

COVID-19 and the cyber security environment

COVID-19, cyber security and the cyber threat environment

The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has seen an increase in reports of malicious actors using COVID-19 in phishing campaigns and malware scams.
In response, CSE continues to leverage all aspects of its mandate to help ensure that Canada is protected against cyber threats.
For example, in coordination with industry partners, CSE has contributed to the removal of thousands of fraudulent sites or email addresses designed for malicious cyber activity, including those impersonating the Government of Canada.
The Cyber Centre has also been working to protect the Government of Canada through a number of measures including continued monitoring of important Government of Canada programs such as the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) against cyber threats.
CSE has also partnered with the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) to launch the CIRA Canadian Shield - a free DNS firewall service that will provide online privacy and security to Canadians.

Details

COVID-19 has presented cybercriminals and fraudsters with an effective lure to encourage victims to visit fake web sites, open e-mail attachments, and click on text message links. These e-mails typically impersonate health organizations, and can pretend to be from the Government of Canada.
CSE's Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in coordination with industry partners, is taking action that is contributing to the removal of a number of fraudulent sites that have spoofed the Public Health Agency of Canada, Canada Revenue Agency, and the Canada Border Services Agency.
The Cyber Centre has also been working to protect the Government of Canada through continued monitoring of important GC programs against cyber threats (including CERB), enabling cyber security monitoring/defence for cloud usage across the GC and evaluating cloud applications, including for the Public Health Agency of Canada.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has also shared advice and guidance to help clients make informed decisions when selecting, installing and using video-teleconferencing tools.
Cyber security tips for remote work were also issued to help inform and educate Canadians about how to stay safe online, particularly while many Canadians are working from home.

The Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) Canadian Shield

On 23 April 2020, the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) announced the official launch of the CIRA Canadian Shield.
The CIRA Canadian Shield is a free DNS firewall service that provides online privacy and security to individuals and families across Canada, based on defensive measures that have already been in place to protect the Government's own systems.
CIRA partnered with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) to integrate its Canadian threat feed into Canadian Shield. No personally identifiable information (PII) of any kind is transmitted to the Cyber Centre as part of this process.

Cyber Centre Support to Government of Canada

CSE, including the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, is always monitoring for cyber threats that may be directed against Canada and Canadians.
CSE has contributed to the removal of thousands of fraudulent sites or email addresses designed for malicious cyber activity, including those impersonating the Government of Canada.
The Cyber Centre has been working to protect the Government of Canada through a number of different measures, including the continued monitoring of important Government of Canada programs such as the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) against cyber threats.
This critical work has also included an evaluation of cloud applications for organizations such as the Public Health Agency of Canada and enabling cyber security monitoring and defence for cloud usage across the Government of Canada.
To help clients and Canadians make informed cyber-safe decisions, the Cyber Centre shared cyber security tips on video-teleconferencing tools and telework.
CSE has also partnered with the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA) to launch the CIRA Canadian Shield - a free DNS firewall service that will provide online privacy and security to Canadians.

Details

Cyber threat actors are attempting to take advantage of Canadians’ heightened levels of concern and fears around COVID-19. Cyber attackers are also looking to exploit teleworking connections, because so many people are now working outside their organizations’ IT security perimeters.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has also shared advice and guidance to help clients make informed decisions when selecting, installing and using video-teleconferencing tools.
Cyber security tips for remote work were also issued by the Cyber Centre to help inform and educate Canadians about how to stay safe online, particularly while many Canadians are working from home.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security has also shared advice and guidance to help inform and educate Canadians about how to stay safe online. Visit: https://cyber.gc.ca/ for more information.

5G (Huawei)

The Government of Canada takes the security of our country’s critical infrastructure very seriously.
5G networks will be a key driver of innovation and enable new technologies such as cleaner energy, smart cities, and autonomous vehicles.
While we cannot comment on specific companies, an examination of emerging 5G technology and the associated security and economic considerations is underway.
Canada’s review will consider technical and security factors, and include advice from our security agencies, and consider decisions from our Allies and partners.
We are committed to the security of Canadian networks and the Government of Canada will take the appropriate decision in due course.

Details

As part of its cyber security mandate, CSE works with telecommunications service providers representing over 99% of Canadian subscribers. In this role, CSE provides advice and guidance to mitigate supply chain risks in telecommunications infrastructures upon which Canadians rely, including, since 2013, a program that has been in place to test and evaluate designated equipment considered for use in Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks, including Huawei.
CSE’s role includes accrediting the third party labs that perform this assurance testing, and defining the testing requirements. CSE reviews the testing results and provides tailored advice and guidance to Canada’s telecommunications sector.
While non-disclosure agreements limit the degree to which CSE can comment on specific details, Canadians can be assured that the Government of Canada is working to make sure that robust protections are in place to safeguard the communications systems that Canadian rely on.

DND issue notes

5G Networks

5G networks will be a key driver of innovation and enable new technologies, such as cleaner energy, smart cities, and faster, more reliable communications technologies.
For National Defence, 5G technology will assist in providing increased connectivity between our digital platforms, members of the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian personnel.
While I cannot comment on specific companies, the Government of Canada is currently reviewing its approach to emerging 5G technology.
Since December 2018, Public Safety has been leading this important review, in collaboration with its partners, including the Communications Security Establishment and National Defence.
The Government of Canada remains committed to the security of Canadian networks and will take the appropriate decision in due course.

Key facts

There are several 5G test beds within Canada, including ENCQOR 5G which is a Canada-Quebec-Ontario partnership focused on research and innovation in the field of 5G.

Details

Review of 5G technology

In December 2018, Public Safety Canada initiated a security examination to assess the risks associated with the shift to fifth generation telecommunications (5G), and to identify potential mitigation measures.
The examination is primarily focused on the technical and national security considerations of 5G, including the extent to which 5G would further enable hostile activity by both state and non-state actors.

Huawei

As part of its cyber security mandate, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) works with telecommunications service providers representing over 99% of Canadian mobile subscribers. CSE provides advice and guidance to mitigate supply chain risks in telecommunications infrastructures upon which Canadians rely, including a program that has been in place since 2013 to test and evaluate designated equipment and services considered for use on Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks, including Huawei.
On March 12, 2020, the Canadian Press published an article with excerpts of an interview with the Chief of the Defence Staff where he expressed concern about anything that could give China access to Canada’s military networks. He expressed confidence, however, in the Government’s ability to mitigate the threats associated with Huawei.
On July 14, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) announced that it was banning the purchase of new Huawei 5G equipment after December 31, and requiring the removal of all Huawei 5G equipment in the UK’s networks by 2027.
The UK’s decision has left Canada as the only FVEYs partner without a ban of some level on Huawei equipment being used for its 5G network.

Recent parliamentary interest

On May 25, 2020, Mr. Scott Jones, Head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security at CSE, appeared alongside Joyce Murray, Minister for Digital Government, before the House Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (OGGO) to discuss cybersecurity in the context of the Government’s response to COVID-19. Conservative Members of Parliament Kelly Block and Kelly McCauley questioned Mr. Jones on the threat and risks of Huawei in Canada’s 5G network. Mr. Jones assured the Committee that CSE is leveraging its full mandate to promote public awareness to thwart external cyber threats and protect Canadians.
Huawei, 5G and Canada’s relationship with China has been a topic of interest to newly elected CPC leader, Erin O’Toole and newly appointed Foreign Affairs critic Michael Chong. CPC members frequently pose questions on Huawei and 5G during Question Period and have put forward motions to study Canada’s critical infrastructure, and 5G networks during committees.

National security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians (NSICOP) Special Report

National security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians’ 2019 special report (CANCIT)

National Defence and the Communications Security Establishment support the important work of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
We continue to carefully consider the Committee’s special report
As part of our ongoing efforts to keep Canada and Canadians safe, National Defence has enhanced its robust oversight framework for defence intelligence activities.
For example, in March 2020, National Defence issued an updated Functional Directive on the protection and handling of Canadian citizens’ information.
We will review this directive annually to ensure that it remains effective.
We recognize the importance of external review in maintaining the trust of Canadians and look forward to continued collaboration with the Committee.

If pressed on the report’s findings:

All defence intelligence activities are authorized by Canadian law and subject to applicable Canadian and international law.
Further, all defence intelligence activities are governed by an extensive body of directives, orders, and policies, and are subject to a robust oversight framework.
National Defence regularly reviews and updates its policies and practices to ensure alignment with the law, with government policy, and with the demands of changing security environment.

Key facts

During the review, National Defence provided over 950 pages of documentation, including responses to follow-up questions.
National Defence provided one Committee briefing, and held seven meetings with the Committee’s Secretariat.
COVID-19: Due to the altered Parliamentary sitting schedule and prorogation, no Committee has yet studied the report.

Details

On March 12, 2020, NSICOP tabled redacted versions of its 2019 Special Reports in Parliament.
The Canadian Citizen Information (CANCIT) report examines the collection, use, retention and dissemination of Canadian citizens’ information in the context of defence intelligence activities.
The report now stands referred to the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence and the House Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Neither Committee has studied the report.
NSICOP is currently conducting a review of the Government of Canada’s cyber defence activities and on Global Affairs Canada’s national security and intelligence activities. Both studies implicate National Defence.

CANCIT special report: key findings and recommendations

Finding: the policy framework that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) follow for the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadians needs clarification.
- Recommendation: DND/CAF rescind the Functional Directive on the Collection of Canadian Citizen Information, and review all of its related functional directives and other policy instruments in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.
Finding: DND/CAF is not fully compliant with the Privacy Act in relation to intelligence activities taking place outside Canada, activities to which the Committee believes the Privacy Act applies.
- Recommendation: The Minister of National Defence should ensure DND/CAF complies with the letter and spirit of the Privacy Act in all of its defence intelligence activities, whether in Canada or abroad.
Finding: The Crown prerogative may not prove to be an adequate source of authority for DND/CAF to conduct its defence intelligence activities, particularly where they involve information about Canadians.
- Recommendation: MND introduce legislation governing defence intelligence activities, including the extent to which DND/CAF should be authorized to collect, use, retain and disseminate information about Canadians in the execution of authorized missions.

Defence intelligence and Canadian citizen information

National Defence does not direct its defence intelligence activities at Canadian citizens, except when authorized as part of a mandated defence activity or in support of another government agency.
- In the event that Canadian citizens’ information is incidentally collected, it is deleted from National Defence databases once it is confirmed that the information cannot be held for defence intelligence purposes to support authorized defence operations and activities or lawfully passed to another Canadian department or agency.
- When supporting another Canadian department or agency, the activities occur under the mandate and authorities of the supported department or agency.
At this time, counter-intelligence is the only defence activity where the CAF is authorized to direct its activities at Canadians other than activities done in support of other departments.
- As part of its mandate to identify, investigate, and counter threats (espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities and other criminal activity) to the security of National Defence, the Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit may, where a national defence nexus exists, investigate Canadian citizens and collect or receive information to provide threat assessments and inform decision-making.
To address the Committee’s recommendation, in March 2020, National Defence issued a new Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive: Guidance on the Protection and Handling of Canadian Citizen Information. It will be reviewed every year.
All National Defence activities are authorized by Canadian law. The Committee has not identified any specific instance where a defence intelligence activity did not comply with the law.
As the Committee found, National Defence applies the Privacy Act to all defence intelligence activities that take place in Canada. Whether the Privacy Act applies to defence intelligence activities outside of Canada is unsettled by law.
- As the Committee recognizes, there is no jurisprudence on this question. However, DND/CAF has consistently applied the principles of the Privacy Act to its defence intelligence activities outside of Canada.
National Defence relies upon the Crown prerogative as an important source of legal authority for its operations and activities. The defence prerogative has been recognized by Canadian courts as a valid source of executive power for the conduct of DND/CAF operations and activities.

Cyber security

Cyber capabilities and expertise are critical to defending Canada against 21st century threats.
The Canadian Armed Forces is continually working to strengthen mission-critical systems, integrate cyber activities into broader military operations, and develop new capabilities.
For example, we are investing $400 million into initiatives to enhance cyber threat identification, response capabilities, and the protection of National Defence’s operational networks.
At the national level, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security serves as a unified source of expert advice and guidance.
The Cyber Centre works closely with government, the private sector, and academia to strengthen Canada’s cyber resilience.
National Defence also works closely with other departments, Allied militaries, and our industry partners to identify evolving threats, increase interoperability, and share best practices.
Together, these efforts will ensure that Canada is able to confront any new cyber threat, including from malicious actors trying to exploit the current COVID-19 pandemic to advance their interests.

Key facts

As committed in Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Canadian Armed Forces have created new cyber roles to attract talent and improve expertise.
- Canadian Armed Forces members in cyber trades: 85
- New cyber trade positions to be filled: 14
The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has a mandate to conduct cyber operations and to assist the Canadian Armed Forces by providing technical and operational assistance.
Created in 2018 as part of CSE, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security unites existing operational cyber security expertise from Public Safety Canada, Shared Services Canada, and CSE.

Details

Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Capital Program

Cyber activities are conducted through the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Cyber Capital Program. Two key projects fall under this program:
- Cyber Defence – Decision Analysis and Response Project: This project will improve cyber threat identification and incident response capabilities. It will also allow for the detection and characterization of suspicious activity, and provide the ability to contain and eradicate threats from DND/CAF networks.
- Network Command and Control Integrated Situational Awareness Capability Project: This project will improve the monitoring of information technology (IT) services and provide enhanced information critical for decision making regarding IT infrastructure.

The Canadian Armed Forces cyber operator

The new cyber operator occupation includes both Reserve and Regular Force members who conduct defensive cyber operations. The Cyber Reserve Force provides full-time capability through part-time service by assigning Primary Reserve units and formations new roles, with the goal of enabling strategic decision-making, supporting operational objectives, and delivering tactical effects.

Active cyber operations

Strong, Secure, Engaged committed the CAF to assuming a more assertive posture in the cyber domain by hardening our defences and by conducting active cyber operations against potential adversaries as part of government-authorized missions.
The Communications Security Establishment Act allows CSE to carry out foreign cyber operations to help protect federal (and designated) information and infrastructure, or to degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to, or interfere with, foreign entities in accordance with Canada’s international affairs, defence, or security objectives.
- CSE has always acted within its lawful authorities to help protect our forces wherever they are deployed, and under the 2019 CSE Act, can provide operational and technical assistance to DND/CAF, including in the conduct of active cyber operations.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security

In Junet 2018, the Government of Canada released an updated National Cyber Security Strategy which sets out Canada’s vision for security and prosperity in the digital age. The Strategy aims to bolster Canada’s cyber security posture by focusing on three key themes: security and resilience, cyber innovation and leadership and collaboration.
The Strategy’s core goals are reflected in Budget 2018’s substantial investments in cyber security and built upon in Budgett 2019. Among the new measures introduced as part of Budget 2018 and a key component of the Strategy is the creation of the Canadian Centre of Cyber Security (the Cyber Centre), housed at CSE.
The Cyber Centre consolidates the key cyber security operational units of the Government of Canada under a single roof. The Cyber Centre is a unified source of expert advice, guidance, services and support on cyber security operational matters, providing Canadian citizens and businesses with a clear and trusted place to turn for cyber security advice.

Committee information and potential questions

CFO deck (Supplementary Estimates B)

2020 Parliamentary Reporting and Supply Cycle

Authorities to Date with Supplementary Estimates (B) Total: $25,044,880,284.

Long description - Graphic 1

Image of supply period cycles with each cycle given a different date. (1) April 1; (2) June 23; (3) December 10; (4) March 26. This information within this image is shown below.

April 1, 2020:

New Fiscal Year and Spending Cycle

April – June 23:

Approval of Main Estimates
Appropriation bill
Tabling of SEA
Approval of SEA Appropriation bill

September – December 10: We are here

Tabling of Public Accounts
Tabling of SEB
Departmental Results Reports
Annual Finance Committee Report
Fall Economic Statement
Approval of SEB Appropriation bill

January- March 26:

Tabling of SEC
Budget presentation
Tabling of Main Estimates
Departmental Plans
Approval of Interim Supply and SEC Appropriation bill


Main Estimates	In Year Adjustments	Supplementary Estimates (A)	Supplementary Estimates (B)	Authorities to Date
$23,317,935,718	$523,772,819	$757,559,488	$445,612,259	$25,044,880,284

Minister of National Defence Portfolio


Organization	$ dollars
Organization	Main Estimates 2020-21	Allotment Adjustments^{Footnote 1}	Supplementary Estimates (A) 2020-21	Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21	Proposed Authorities to Date 2020-21 as at Supplementary Estimates (B)
National Defence	23,317,935,718	523,772,819	757,559,488	445,612,259	25,044,880,284
Communications Security Establishment Canada	711,781,372	24,216,575	-	5,610,492	741,608,439
Military Grievances External Review Committee	6,883,603	298,943	-	-	7,182,546
Military Police Complaints Commission of Canada	4,802,446	216,003	-	-	5,018,449
Total	24,041,403,139	548,504,340	757,559,488	451,222,751	25,798,689,718

Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 by Vote


Vote	$ dollars
Vote	New Authorities	Transfers	Net Increase to Authorities
1 – Operating Day-to-day operating costs, such as salaries, utilities, and maintenance	263,242,826	(42,915,398)	220,327,428
5 – Capital Assets that meet the criteria for a tangible capital asset; there is a useful life greater than one year and an acquisition cost of at least $30 thousand	108,503,474	9,975,050	118,478,524
10 – Grants and Contributions Voted transfer payments that typically include monetary payments to third parties	30,000,000	40,018,834	70,018,834
Total – Voted	401,746,300	7,078,486	408,824,786
Statutory Authorities provided through legislation other than appropriation acts, such as contributions to employee benefit plans	36,787,473	-	36,787,473
Total – Voted and Statutory	438,533,773	7,078,486	445,612,259

Authorities to date: $25,044.9M

Authorities to Date: $25,044.9M - Long description graphics

Both these graphs show the amount of money allocated to the authorities to date. The authorities to date are further broken down into two graphs described below. In the first graph, Main Estimates are allocated $23,317.9 million, Allotment Adjustments is allocated $523.8 million, SEA is allocated $757.6 million, and finally SEB is allocated $445.6 million. In the second graph, Vote 1 (Operating) is allocated $220.3 million, Vote 5 (Capital) is allocated $118.5 million, Vote 10 (Grants and Contributions) is allocated $70 million, and finally Statutory is allocated $36.8 million.

Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 Voted Appropriations


Item	$ millions
Item	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Statutory	Total^{Footnote 2}
Funding to support the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to COVID-19 (Including Operation LASER) Funding related to National Defence’s response to COVID-19.	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Statutory	Total^{Footnote 2}	234.7	21.3	-	36.4	292.4
Funding for a number of capital investments previously approved and funded through the capital investment fund Funding to support various SSE investments.	-	86.7	-	-	86.7
Funding for the Inuvik Runway Extension Project Contribution funding to the Government of Northwest Territories to extend the existing runway at the Forward Operating Location Inuvik co-located on the Inuvik NT Airport.	-	-	30.0	-	30.0
Funding for the Hornet Extension Project To maintain operational parity & support the transition of the Future Fighter Capability Project.	16.2	-	-	-	16.2
Funding for the Canadian Special Operations Regiment - Infrastructure To construct permanent infrastructure for the Canadian Special Operations Regiment at Garrison Petawawa.	6.5	0.5	-	0.02	7.1
Funding for the Cyber Defence – Decision Analysis and Response Project To initiate work associated with the acquisition of an integrated defensive cyber capability.	5.8	-	-	0.4	6.2
Total Approved Items^{Footnote 3}	263.2	108.5	30.0	36.8	438.5

Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 Transfer Details


Transfers from other organizations - $15.1 million	$ millions
Transfers from other organizations - $15.1 million	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 4}
From Shared Services Canada for the return of the final surplus for Phases 2 and 3 of the Carling Campus Project in Ottawa, Ontario Return of remaining surplus at the end of Phases 2 and 3 of the Carling Campus Project.	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 4}	-	13.1	-	13.1
From the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council to support the costs associated with managing their research enterprise at the Royal Military College of Canada Funding for the Research Support Fund (RSF) to ease the administrative burden caused by managing the Research Enterprise at RMC.	0.8	-	-	0.8
From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development to adjust funding previously provided for departmental staff located at missions abroad Refund for the common services provided to support departmental staff located at missions abroad under VCDS Directorate of Foreign Liaison and VCDS OUTCAN Coordination.	0.7	-	-	0.7
From the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council to Support the Canada Research Chairs at the Royal Military College of Canada Funding to hire replacement professors while the Canada Research Chairs Program (CRCP) chairs conduct their approved research projects.	0.3	-	-	0.3
From the Treasury Board Secretariat for innovative approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in government operations Funding to support the exploration and sharing of innovating approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in government operations – AMAZE project and Kingston Greenhouse gas reduction project.	0.2	-	-	0.2
Subtotal transfers from other organizations^{Footnote 5}	2.0	13.1	-	15.1

Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 Transfer Details Continued


Transfers to other organizations - ($8.0) million	$ millions
Transfers to other organizations - ($8.0) million	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 6}
To the Department of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs for the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation Funding to cover expenses in relation to the property maintenance of Camp Ipperwash.	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 6}	(0.2)	-	-	(0.2)
To the Department of Industry to maintain the Shirleys Bay Campus, in the National Capital Region Funding to support DND’s portion of the Shirley’s Bay Campus Capital Investment Plan (CIP).	-	(0.4)	-	(0.4)
To the Department of Indigenous Services to provide support funding to the Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point (CKSPFN) for the development of twenty housing Chippewas units and related infrastructure at Former Camp Ipperwash Funding to provide the CKSPFN support to undertake the planning and design of twenty interim housing units and related infrastructure at Former Camp Ipperwash.	(0.4)	-	-	(0.4)
To the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council for Research Partnership Grants Funding to cover DND’s share of the jointly funded DND/NSERC Research Partnership Grants.	(0.6)	-	-	(0.6)
To the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council to support joint research grant projects Funding for a joint initiative agreement to support social sciences & humanities and natural sciences & engineering research and related activities.	(1.3)	-	-	(1.3)
To the Department of Natural Resources for the Polar Continental Shelf Program in Resolute, Nunavut Funding is in support of the sustainment of the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre (CAFATC) for the 2020-21 fiscal year.	(2.4)	-	-	(2.4)

Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 Transfer Details Continued


Transfers to other organizations, cont’d - ($8.0) million	$ millions
Transfers to other organizations, cont’d - ($8.0) million	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 7}
From the Department of National Defence to various organizations to support the Canadian Safety and Security Program Funding is to support the Canadian Safety and Security Program (CSSP), which provides strategic technology acquisitions that enhance federal science and technology capabilities for public safety and security.	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 7}	-	(2.7)	-	(2.7)
Subtotal transfers to other organizations^{Footnote 8}	(4.9)	(3.1)	-	(8.0)


Internal Reallocations ($0 Net Impact)	$ millions
Internal Reallocations ($0 Net Impact)	Vote 1	Vote 5	Vote 10	Total^{Footnote 9}
Internal reallocation of resources for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization From Vote 1 to Vote 10 for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ($18.3 million for NATO Military Budget and $21.7 million for NATO Security Investment Program).	(40.0)	-	40.0	-
Subtotal internal reallocations^{Footnote 10}	(40.0)	-	40.0	-
Total Net Transfers^{Footnote 11}	(42.9)	10.0	40.0	7.1

Next Steps


Key Event	Timeline	Notes
Tabling	22 October	President of the Treasury Board tables the Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 in the House of Commons.
Committee Discussion	TBD November / December	Committees approve, reduce, or “negative” (not approve) a vote but may not increase the amount of a vote or transfer between votes.
Royal Assent	TBD	After House of Commons and Senate approval, the appropriation act for Supplementary Estimates (B) 2020-21 becomes law and receives Royal Assent.

Footnotes

1

National Defence allotment adjustments include: $523.8 million from the 2019-20 Operating Budget Carry Forward.

Return to footnote 1 referrer

2