House Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) Appearance, Deputy Chief, Signals Intelligence, CSE – November 1, 2022

Table of contents

• Appearance details
  • Opening remarks
• Committee information and potential questions
  • Potential questions and answers
  • Media lines
  • Committee backgrounder
  • Committee membership
• CSE issue notes
  • Top cybersecurity points
  • Foreign interference and cyber threats to democratic process
  • Cyber security and cyber incidents
  • Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian cyber threats to Canada
  • Arctic defence and sovereignty
  • CSE recruitment and retention
  • Review and oversight of CSE’s activities
  • Protecting Canada’s telecommunications systems
  • Privacy and spyware technology
  • Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA)

Appearance details

Date: Tuesday, November 1, 2022

Location: Virtual

Time: 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm

Appearing:

• Alia Tayyeb, Deputy Chief, Signals Intelligence, CSE
• Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director, Operations, CSIS

Details: Invited to appear to discuss possible threat that foreign actors (working within or outside Canada) pose to the integrity of Canadian elections, including risks for foreign interference.

Opening remarks

Introduction

• Hello/Bonjour. Thank you, Ms. Chair, and members of the Committee, for the invitation to appear today.
• My name is Alia Tayyeb, my pronouns are she/her/elle, and I am the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Communications Security Establishment’s Signals Intelligence branch. CSE is Canada’s national cyber security and foreign signals intelligence agency.
• I am pleased to be joined by my colleague Michelle Tessier from CSIS.
• Today, I will provide you with an update from CSE’s perspective on the threat of foreign interference to our electoral system.

Threat environment

• I’ll begin by outlining some of the key trends we have observed. On Friday, we published the renewed National Cyber Threat Assessment, more commonly known as the NCTA.
• The NCTA highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries seeking to influence elections and impact international discourse related to current events.
• We assess that misinformation, disinformation and malinformation (or MDM) propagated by state-sponsored cyber threat actors represents an ongoing, persistent threat to Canadians.
  • Adversary states constantly circulate and amplify MDM that supports their interests.
  • Further, we've seen that state-sponsored cyber threat activity is impacting Canadians by targeting both individuals and Canada’s economy at large.
    • Individuals are targeted including diaspora populations and activists in Canada. They may also target Canadians individual personal information.
    • Another method state sponsored actors utilize is targeting Canada’s economic value, this may be done through intellectual property theft and foreign intelligence operations.
• Canada’s active participation in the international community and membership in key organizations, such as NATO and the G7, almost certainly make Canadians a target for online foreign influence campaigns.
• Between 2015 and 2020, the vast majority of cyber threat activity affecting democratic processes could be attributed to state-sponsored cyber threat actors.
• Russia, China, and Iran were very likely responsible for most of the foreign state-sponsored cyber threat activity against democratic processes worldwide.
• But you’re likely wondering, what are we doing to prevent and defend against these threats?
  • We collect foreign intelligence on the activities of foreign states, including any foreign interference activities directed at Canada’s democratic institutions or processes;
  • We provide cyber security and information assurance, including providing advice and defences against malicious state actors who may seek to use cyber as a tool for foreign interference.
    • For example, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, we have observed numerous Russian-backed disinformation campaigns online, designed to discredit and spread disinformation about NATO allies, as well as false narratives about Canada’s involvement in the conflict.
    • We shared this information on Twitter as part of the Government of Canada’s efforts to help inform Canadians.
  • In addition, we can conduct active and defensive cyber operations to disrupt hostile activities from foreign states, which could include disrupting foreign interference activities, and;
  • We provide technical and operational assistance to CSIS, RCMP, and CAF as they seek to identify, prevent, and disrupt foreign interference.
• CSE and its Cyber Centre have also worked directly with Elections Canada for several years providing cyber security advice and guidance. This partnership continues today, and we continue to support their efforts to ensure secure elections.
• I know that later this week you will be hearing from the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, or SITE for short, so I will only briefly outline here CSE’s role in SITE.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, we worked closely with partners as part of the SITE Task to monitor for foreign threats and interference with electoral processes in Canada.

Conclusion

• Outside of the context of an election, our intelligence work continues and provides insights to partners with respect to foreign interference, and our Cyber Security work continues to prevent and defend against cyber intrusions that could enable foreign interference.
• Members, I can assure you that CSE remains vigilant in monitoring for any developing foreign threats, including those that may look to cause interference with electoral processes in Canada.
• If you would like more information, we would encourage you to read the NCTA and the Cyber threats to Canada's democratic process report.
• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, CSE will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

Committee information and potential questions

Potential questions and answers

Foreign interference

1. What threats are there to our elections from a foreign interference lens? What has CSE done to guard against this?

• CSE has provided an unclassified assessment of cyber threats to Canada’s democratic process in 2017, 2019, and 2021. Within each assessment, foreign interference is included as a key threat to Canada’s elections.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, CSE worked with partners at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the RCMP as the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
• CSE’s role in SITE was to monitor for foreign threats and interference with electoral processes in Canada.
• If CSE were to become aware of a cyber threat, including those directed at a provincial electoral process, we would take appropriate action to address the threat.

2. CSE received funding in Budget 2022 for Protecting Democracy- how are you utilizing this funding?

• The Government of Canada is investing resources to acquire greater insights on strategic priorities related to hostile threat actors. Hostile threat actors affect global events contrary to Canada's interests, making them priority enduring intelligence targets for Canada.
• The critical foreign intelligence acquired by CSE, in accordance with GC priorities, enables the Government to promote Canada’s economic prosperity, protect Canada’s digital infrastructure from malicious cyber activity, and defend Canada’s national security from threats such as foreign espionage.

3. The Globe and Mail reported that researchers say a disinformation campaign against former MP Kenny Chiu is a disturbing precedent. How can MPs protect themselves/what is CSE doing to protect MPs?

• The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference and disinformation, regardless of the source.
• CSE’s Cyber Centre works with the House of Commons (HoC) to protect HoC devices, systems and information, including those of MPs.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
• In advance of the 2019 General Election, CSE and the Cyber Centre made the decision to offer cabinet ministers a 24/7 cyber hotline service, providing centralized support in the event they suspected their ministerial, parliamentary, or personal communications, e-mail or social media accounts were compromised.
• The hotline provided a 24/7 priority service in the case of a cyber incident and is still operational today.
• The Cyber Centre reached out to all registered federal political parties to determine their top-of-mind cyber security concerns. Based on that feedback, we offered guidance and threat briefings to meet those priorities.
• CSE will continue to actively work to ensure the protection of all Canadians, including MP’s.

4. What can Canadians do to protect themselves online from threat of foreign interference?

• There are a few things Canadians can do to help protect themselves online:
  • Always practice good cyber hygiene.
  • Use unique passphrases or complex passwords and two-factor authentication, wherever possible.
  • Be suspicious of unsolicited or unusual emails, and do not click on any links that may be contained in them.
  • Use as many security options (settings) as you can for each social media platform.
  • Remove unused or outdated apps, and update those you do use regularly to ensure the latest security measures are in place.
  • Visit www.cyber.gc.ca for more information about best cyber security practices.
  • If you think you are witnessing questionable activity online, you can report any suspected violations to the social media platform’s security centre.

5. Are you aware of foreign cyber threat activities targeting Canadian democratic institutions or processes?

• In CSE’s most recent report on Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process, we have assessed that state-sponsored actors with ties to Russia, China, and Iran are responsible for the majority of cyber threat activity against democratic processes worldwide.
• For example, state-sponsored actors have promoted content and messaging related to QAnon for the purpose of reaching voters in the US.
• These reports are intended to raise awareness and draw further attention to known state-sponsored cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target Canada’s democratic processes.

6. Are Chinese or Russian state-sponsored actors attempting to disrupt Canadian democratic institutions or processes?

• CSE has assessed that both China and Russia, along with Iran, are responsible for the majority of cyber threat activity against democratic processes worldwide.
• Since 2015, over 90 percent of the cyber threat activity against democratic processes we observed by Russia, China and Iran targeted states and regions of strategic significance to them.
• State-sponsored actors such as these, have taken advantage of domestic groups and movements in other countries and used the messages and reach of these domestic groups to better influence voters.
• Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.

7. The National Cyber Threat Assessment points to state-sponsored activities of China and Russia, as well as a few other countries, specifically. What is CSE doing to protect Government of Canada networks from these threats?

• CSE is the primary centralized voice and resource for senior leadership in Government on cyber security operational matters, including incident management, situational awareness, and technical advice and guidance.
• CSE defends Government of Canada cyber systems, and respond to significant cyber security threats and incidents to reduce and mitigate harm to the Federal Government.
• CSE is a central resource for Government of Canada departments in support of their roles within their sectors.

8. What can we as Members of Parliament (MPs) do to protect ourselves online?

• Create strong passwords and use two step verification
• Utilize Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
• Social Media: Review the privacy settings in your apps. Look for security features the app includes such as encryption and two step.
• Secure data storage and backup: Data encryption. Backup your data and know how to recover it (e.g. ransomware).
• Apply updates: Apply updates to your devices, operating systems and applications as they come out. This includes mobile phones. Use security software and keep it updated.

Russian invasion of Ukraine and cyber threats

9. Has CSE seen an increase in cyber threats to Canada’s democratic institutions or processes since the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

• There have been high volumes of cyber activity in the lead up to and during the Russian war.
• Cyber threats are constant and ever-present in Canada.
• Canada is one of the most targeted countries in the world and Canadian organizations remain attractive targets for cybercriminals and state-sponsored cyber threat actors.
• Our security and intelligence agencies coordinated integrated government efforts by raising awareness, monitoring, and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy.
• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, CSE will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

10. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the destabilizing Russian presence in cyberspace have highlighted the need to reinforce our cyber defence. Could you tell us a bit more about the work that the Communications Security Establishment has undertaken to protect Canada’s democratic institutions and processes?

• The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference, regardless of the source.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
• CSE’s Cyber Centre also worked with Elections Canada to help secure election systems and infrastructure.
• Our security and intelligence agencies coordinated integrated government efforts by raising awareness, monitoring, and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy.
• SITE Task Force partners will continue to work within their respective mandates to detect and counter possible foreign threats to Canada and its democratic institutions.
• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, CSE will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

11. What lessons have been learned about state-sponsored cyber threat actors' cyber tactics, such as election interference, and how to counter them?

• State-sponsored threats actors, such as Russia, have sophisticated cyber capabilities and has demonstrated a willingness to use them.
• Some trends noted in CSE’s most recent Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process Report, include:
  • The vast majority of cyber threat activity affecting democratic processes can be attributed to state-sponsored cyber threat actors, namely Russia, China, and Iran;
  • Cyber threat actors most often target some combination of voters, political parties, and election infrastructure;
  • This kind of activity included online foreign influence activity as well as more traditional cyber threat activities, like information theft or denying access to important websites; and
  • The world response to COVID-19, such as incorporating new technology into the voting process, almost certainly increased the cyber threat surface of democratic processes.
  • In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
  • The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference, regardless of the source.

Cyber security

12. What support has CSE provided in response to cyber threats to Canada’s elections or democratic institutions?

• The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference, regardless of the source.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
• In advance of the 2019 General Election, CSE and the Cyber Centre made the decision to offer cabinet ministers a 24/7 cyber hotline service, providing centralized support in the event they suspected their ministerial, parliamentary, or personal communications, e-mail or social media accounts were compromised.
• The hotline provided a 24/7 priority service in the case of a cyber incident and is still operational today.
• In addition to this service, CSE and its Cyber Centre provided a point of contact to all 16 federal registered political parties for further discussion on the cyber security challenges related to Canada’s democratic process.
• If any political parties and/or candidates encountered any suspicious cyber activity, we had also designated a quick response point of contact for them, which was coordinated through each political party’s headquarters.
• SITE Task Force partners continue to work within their respective mandates to detect and counter possible foreign threats to Canada and its democratic institutions.
• While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, CSE will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

13. What lessons have been learned about state-sponsored cyber threat actors' cyber tactics, such as election interference, and how to counter them?

• State-sponsored threats actors, such as Russia, have sophisticated cyber capabilities and has demonstrated a willingness to use them.
• Some trends noted in CSE’s most recent Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process Report, include:
  • The vast majority of cyber threat activity affecting democratic processes can be attributed to state-sponsored cyber threat actors, namely Russia, China, and Iran;
  • Cyber threat actors most often target some combination of voters, political parties, and election infrastructure;
  • This kind of activity included online foreign influence activity as well as more traditional cyber threat activities, like information theft or denying access to important websites; and
  • The world response to COVID-19, such as incorporating new technology into the voting process, almost certainly increased the cyber threat surface of democratic processes.
• In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Global Affairs Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
• The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference, regardless of the source.

14. Does CSE have any concerns about the spread of misinformation or disinformation by threat actors on social media apps, specifically with an aim to interfere in Canada’s election process?

• It is important to note how pervasive falsehoods on social media and in the domestic information ecosystem create opportunities that foreign cyber threat actors can exploit to covertly disseminate information.
• Some governments and political parties employ disinformation or manipulate the online information ecosystem to influence voters.
• Threat actors can also spread disinformation after an election to undermine trust in the results or attempt to stop the elected government from taking office.
• More recently, CSE shared information on social media as part of the Government of Canada’s efforts to help inform Canadians on how to help stop the spread and protect themselves from disinformation.
• CSE continues to provide the Government of Canada with the most comprehensive information available related to Canada’s intelligence priorities, directly furthering Canadian safety, security, and prosperity.
• It is important for Canadians to adopt good cyber security practices – which CSE shares on the cyber.gc.ca website.

The National Cyber Threat Assessment report

15. What is the National Cyber Threat Assessment report? What information does it include?

• The Cyber Centre produces a report every two years outlining the greatest threats Canada faces.
• The key judgements in this report are based on reporting from multiple sources, including classified and unclassified information. The judgements are based on the Cyber Centre’s knowledge and expertise in cyber security and informed by CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate, which provides us with valuable insights on cyber threat activity around the world.

16. What are the primary concerns and observations made in the report?

• On Friday, October 28, CSE released its National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024, which provides an overview of five key cyber threat trends that are the most dynamic and impactful and that will continue to drive cyber threat activity to 2024:
  • First, ransomware is a persistent threat to Canadian organizations;
  • Second, critical infrastructure is increasingly at risk from cyber threat activity;
  • Third, State-sponsored cyber threat activity is impacting Canadians;
  • Fourth, cyber threat actors are attempting to influence Canadians and degrade trust in online spaces; and
  • Finally, disruptive technologies bring new opportunities and new threats.

Media lines

CSE key messages

• As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities.
• The Communications Security Establishment Act (the CSE Act) sets out five aspects of our mandate: cyber security and information assurance; foreign intelligence; defensive cyber operations; active cyber operations; and technical and operation assistance. We use our technical expertise in all five aspects of our mandate. We do so to keep Canadians safe and secure.
• CSE’s foreign signals intelligence program provides Canada’s senior decision-makers with insights into the activities, motivations, capabilities, and intentions of foreign adversaries, and the international readiness and foreign reactions to a variety of diverse global events.
• CSE’s intelligence reporting also identifies hostile state activities, and the CSE Act authorizes us to assist the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.
• We support Canadian military operations and protect forces deployed abroad through advanced cyber techniques. For example, CSE could protect Canadian forces by disrupting an adversary’s ability to communicate or providing intelligence regarding an imminent threat.
• The CSE Act gives CSE the legal authority to conduct cyber operations to disrupt foreign-based threats to Canada. This includes active cyber operations to degrade, disrupt, respond to, or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign individuals, states, and organizations.
• If there are reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign state or actor constitutes a threat to the security of Canada and/or Canadian military forces, we are prepared to take appropriate action to address the threat.
• We continue to provide the Government of Canada with the most comprehensive information available related to Canada’s intelligence priorities, directly furthering Canadian safety, security, and prosperity.

CSE’s support to the Canadian Armed Forces and Operation UNIFIER

• As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities. The CSE Act includes authorities that allow us to provide technical and operational assistance to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
• CSE is authorized to assist the CAF in support of government-authorized military missions, such as Operation UNIFIER. This support includes intelligence sharing and cyber security.
• While we can’t speak about specific operations, CSE can be counted to deliver on its mission working with Canada’s military presence in support of Ukraine.
• This increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats.

CSE’s messaging on cyber security in response to Ukraine and geopolitical events

• The Government of Canada’s cyber defence team, including CSE, is constantly reviewing measures to ensure our systems and information networks remain secure. We have tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address them.
• Russia has significant cyber capabilities and a demonstrated history of using them irresponsibly, this includes: SolarWinds cyber compromise; COVID-19 vaccine development; Georgia’s democratic process; and NotPetya malware. In light of Russia’s ongoing, unjustified invasion of Ukraine, CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) strongly encourage all Canadian organizations to take immediate action and bolster their online cyber defenses.
• We can confirm that CSE has been tracking cyber threat activity associated with the current crisis. CSE has been sharing valuable cyber threat intelligence with key partners in Ukraine and continues to work with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in support of Ukraine.
• As the situation has deteriorated, CSE’s Cyber Centre continues to monitor the cyber threat environment in Canada and globally, including cyber threat activity directed at critical infrastructure networks, operational and information technology (OT/IT). We recently issued a new unclassified threat bulletin on cyber threat activity related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Most importantly, we assess that the scope and severity of cyber operations related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has almost certainly been more sophisticated and widespread than has been reported in open sources.
• We remind Canadian critical infrastructure operators and defenders to be aware of the risks and take mitigations against known Russian-backed cyber threat activity. Now is the time to take defensive action and be proactive in network monitoring and applying appropriate mitigations.
• In addition to public advisories, the Cyber Centre continues to share valuable cyber threat information with Canadian critical infrastructure partners via protected channels. This information includes indicators of compromise, threat mitigation advice, and confidential alerts regarding new forms of malware, and other tactics, techniques, and procedures being used to target victims.
• The Cyber Centre is aware of malicious cyber activity by Russian threat actors; however, this activity is primarily related to cybercrime, and it is persistent and ongoing.
• While the Cyber Centre is not currently aware of any notable change in specific threats to Canadian organizations in relation to events in and around Ukraine, there has been an historical pattern of cyber attacks on Ukraine having international consequences, such as the malware known as NotPetya in 2017.

Cyber Incident Involving the National Research Council of Canada:

• CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) can confirm we worked in coordination with the National Research Council (NRC) and government cyber security partners in response to a cyber incident in March 2022.
• The Government of Canada, like every other government and private sector organization in the world, is subject to ongoing and persistent cyber threats. Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, and targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information. We are constantly reviewing measures to protect Canadians and our critical infrastructure from electronic threats, hacking, and cyber espionage.
• We are unable to comment further on any specific details regarding this incident. We can assure that you we continue to work closely with our cyber defence colleagues at the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer, and Shared Services Canada to ensure there are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to neutralize threats when they occur.

Cyber Threats to Canadian Critical Infrastructure

• The Government of Canada, through CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre), has been in contact with critical infrastructure operators to ensure they are aware of cyber threats related to geopolitical tensions. CSE continues to monitor Russia-backed cyber actors and share threat-related information with Canadians and Canadian organizations in a timely basis.
• As outlined in the National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 report, we do not assess that a nation state actor (such as Russia) would intentionally seek to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure and cause major damage or loss of line in the absence of international hostilities. Our judgement from NCTA 2020 still holds, specifically that “international hostilities” means conflict in which Canada is directly involved as a belligerent or active participant, rather than as a supporter.
• As noted in the July 2022 cyber threat bulletin, our intelligence indicates that Russian cyber threat actors are exploring options for potential cyber operations against Ukraine’s supporters, including Canada. This would include activities like cyberespionage, pre-positioning and potentially disruptive cyber operations against critical infrastructure targets. However, a Russian cyber “attack” against Canada, meaning a destructive cyber operation, still remains very unlikely.
• Notwithstanding current geopolitical events, the Cyber Centre shares valuable cyber threat information with Canada’s critical infrastructure partners via protected channels on a regular basis.
• This information includes indicators of compromise, threat mitigation advice, and confidential alerts regarding new forms of malware, and other tactics, techniques, and procedures being used to target victims.
• Canada has a strong and valuable relationship with its Five Eyes alliance partners, including our intelligence, cyber defence, and law enforcement counterparts in the United States. We regularly share information with our partners that has a significant impact on protecting our respective countries’ safety and security. While we can’t confirm or deny, or offer specific details on the intelligence shared, threat information to help defend against critical infrastructure threats is regularly shared and acted upon as appropriate.

Cyber Incident Involving Global Affairs Canada

• On January 24, 2022, the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they were working with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC).
• The cyber incident was detected on January 19, after which mitigation actions were taken. GAC’s loss of internal services were primarily related to the mitigation actions taken by government cyber security partners.
• Critical services for Canadians through Global Affairs Canada remained functioning. Access to a very limited number of internet-based services remained restricted as part of the mitigation measures.
• There is no indication that any other government departments were impacted by this incident.
• There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur.
• We are unable to comment further on any specific details for operational reasons.
• Our cyber defence and incident response teams work 24/7 to identify compromises and alert potential victims within the federal government and Canadian critical infrastructure. In the wake of a cyber incident, the incident response team offers advice and support to contain the threat and mitigate any potential harm.
• We are constantly reviewing measures to protect Canadians and our critical infrastructure from electronic threats, hacking, and cyber espionage. We encourage all government and non-government partners to use cyber security best practices.

Statement - Update on GAC Cyber Incident

The Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), can confirm they continue to work with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a recent cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

Critical services for Canadians through Global Affairs Canada remained functional through mitigation efforts, and since our last statement nearly all GAC priority services have been restored. It is important to note that any GAC internet-based services that were impacted during the past week were a result of the mitigation efforts taken to resolve the incident, and were preventative in nature.

Equally important to note, there continues to be no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.

The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day.

Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information.

We urge Canadians and Canadian organizations to remain vigilant and to visit Cyber.gc.ca and getcybersafe.gc.ca for tips on how to stay secure online.

CSIS comments that Canada is subject to thousands of cyber attacks every day

• The Government of Canada (GC) faces a variety of sophisticated and unsophisticated cyber threats on a daily basis. Cyber threat actors probe government systems and networks millions of times daily, looking for vulnerabilities, and these activities are becoming more frequent and more sophisticated.
• CSE works every day to defend government systems from these attempts. The hundreds of millions of malicious activities include, for example, reconnaissance scans, direct attempts to install malicious software on government networks, and attempts to access GC databases.
• On any given day, CSE’s defensive systems can block anywhere from 2 to 7 billion events targeting GC networks. These defensive actions are a result of CSE’s existing dynamic cyber defence capabilities which remain ready to defend Government of Canada systems and help protect against future attacks.
• CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) work diligently with Shared Services Canada and our other partners to ensure Government of Canada networks and infrastructure are well defended against cyber threats.
• Even though we know that Canadian cyber incidents are underreported to law enforcement and the Cyber Centre, we receive approximately 100 reports per month from Canadians and Canadian organizations.
• The Cyber Centre has knowledge of 235 ransomware incidents against Canadian victims from 1 January to 16 November 2021. More than half of these victims were critical infrastructure providers. It is important to note, however, that most ransomware events remain unreported.

House of Commons IT Incident

• On Wednesday, October 12, 2022, the House of Commons Administration detected a threat to its IT infrastructure.
• Since then, the CSE’s Centre for Cyber Security has been supporting the House of Commons in its investigation of the threat.
• The House of Commons is following established IT security protocols, based on standard IT best practices.
• The House of Commons is taking all necessary countermeasures to safeguard their systems and information assets and to ensure continuity of services. This includes having users reset their passwords.
• Critical services for parliamentarians and House of Commons staff are currently functioning. Access to a small number of Internet-based services remains restricted as mitigation measures continue; work is underway to restore these services.
• No additional information can be provided at this point.

Committee backgrounder

44th Parliament, 1st Session

Under its mandate, the Committee may review and report about the following matters:

• the Standing Orders, procedure and practice in the House of Commons and its committees;
• the election of members to the House of Commons, including reviewing and reporting on matters related to the Chief Electoral Officer, his or her appointment, and Elections Canada;
• conflict of interest matters relating to Members of the House of Commons, including responsibility over the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and the activities of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner that relate to the Code;
• the Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Commons: Sexual Harassment Between Members;
• the administration of the House and the provision of services and facilities to members, reporting in this case to the Speaker and the Board of Internal Economy;
• the effectiveness, management and operation of all operations under the joint administration of both Houses of Parliament, except for the Library of Parliament;
• the broadcasting of the House of Commons and its committees; and
• Order in Council appointments made pursuant to Standing Order 110.

Appearances

• April 11, 2019, CSE appeared before PROC to discuss Safeguarding the 2019 General Election and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force

Key studies

44th Parliamentary Session:

• Foreign Election Interference
• Hybrid Proceedings
• Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St
• Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons
• Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots
• Bill C-14, An Act to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 (electoral representation)

Previous meetings (current session)

Tuesday, October 25th, 2022: Hybrid Proceedings.

Witnesses Included:

• Matthew Hamlyn, Strategic Director, Chamber Business Team, House of Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
• Nathan Cooper, Speaker, Legislative Assembly of Alberta
• David McGill, Clerk and Chief Executive, Scottish Parliament
• Siwan Davies, Director of Senedd Business, Welsh Parliament

Thursday, October 20th, 2022: Hybrid Proceedings.

Witnesses Included:

• Eleanor Fast, Executive Director, Equal Voice
• Maggie Patterson, Director of Programs, Equal Voice
• Catherine Clark, Co-Founder, Honest Talk
• Jennifer Stewart, Co-Founder, Honest Talk
• Sabreena Delhon, Executive Director, Samara Centre for Democracy
• Philippe Fournier, Assistant Professor, Audiologist, Université Laval
• Kilian G. Seeber, Professor, University of Geneva
• Darren Tse, Otolaryngologist and Neuro-Otologist, Assistant Professor, Department of Otolaryngology and Head and Neck Surgery, University of Ottawa

Tuesday, October 18, 2022: Election of Vice-Chairs and Hybrid Proceedings.

• John Nater was elected First Vice-Chair of the committee.

Witnesses Included:

• Carol Hughes, Algoma—Manitoulin—Kapuskasing
• Yvonne Jones, Labrador
• Tom Kmiec, Calgary Shepard
• Andréanne Larouche, Shefford
• Jean Yip, Scarborough—Agincourt
• Hon. Ted Arnott, Speaker, Legislative Assembly of Ontario
• Hon. Derek Bennett, Speaker, Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly

Thursday, October 6, 2022: Hybrid Proceedings.

Witnesses Included:

• Paule Antonelli, Local 900 Acting President, Interpreters' Representative on Local 900 Council (TR), Canadian Association of Professional Employees
• André Picotte, Acting President, Canadian Association of Professional Employees
• Matthew Ball, Acting Chief Executive Officer, Public Services and Procurement Canada, Translation Bureau
• Caroline Corneau, Acting Vice-President, Service to Parliament and Interpretation, Translation Bureau
• Linda Ballantyne, President, International Association of Conference Interpreters - Canada Region,
• Jim Thompson, Communication and Parliamentary Advisor, International Association of Conference Interpreters - Canada Region,
• Kathy L. Brock, Professor and Senior Fellow, School of Policy Studies and Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University
• Jonathan Malloy, Professor, Bell Chair in Canadian Parliamentary Democracy, Department of Political Science, Carleton University
• Erica Rayment, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary
• Melanee Thomas, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary

Tuesday, October 4th, 2022: Hybrid Proceedings.

Witnesses Included:

• Stéphan Aubé, Chief Information Officer, Digital Services and Real Property, House of Commons
• Parm Bains, Steveston—Richmond East, House of Commons
• Laurel Collins, Victoria, House of Commons
• Eric Janse, Deputy Clerk, Procedure, House of Commons
• Michel Patrice, Deputy Clerk, Administration, House of Commons
• Charles Robert, Clerk of the House of Commons, House of Commons
• Léo Duguay, President, Canadian Association of Former Parliamentarians
• Dona Cadman, Former Member of Parliament

Tuesday, September 27th, 2022: Committee Business.

Thursday, September 22nd, 2022: Committee Business.

Tuesday, June 21st, 2022: Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Witnesses Included:

• Larry Brookson, Acting Director, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons

Tuesday, June 14th, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons; Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots and; Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Thursday, June 9th 2022: Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St. and Preserving Provincial Representation in the House of Commons Act.

Witnesses Included:

• Steve Kanellakos, City Manager, City of Ottawa
• Renée Amilcar, General Manager, Transit Services Department, City of Ottawa
• Tobi Nussbaum, Chief Executive Officer, National Capital Commission
• Alain Miguelez, Vice-President, Capital Planning, National Capital Commission
• Patrick Leclerc, General Manager, Société de transport de l’Outaouais
• Alain Tremblay, Project Office Manager, Tramway Gatineau-Ottawa, Société de transport de l’Outaouais
• Pierre Desjardins, Senior Director, Electoral Redistribution, Elections Canada
• Robert Sampson, General Counsel and Senior Director, Legal Services, Elections Canada
• Rachel Pereira, Director, Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office
• Nicholas MacDonald, Legal Counsel, Legal Services Sector, Privy Council Office

Tuesday, June 7th, 2022: Bill C-14. Witnesses Included:

• Patrick Taillon, Tenured Professor, Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Université Laval
• Rachel Pereira, Director, Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office
• Allen Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office

Thursday, June 2nd 2022: Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Witnesses Included:

• Hon. Vernon Darryl White, Senator
• Wendy Jocko, Chief, Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation
• Veldon Coburn, Assistant Professor, Indigenous Studies, University of Ottawa
• Peter Sloly, Former Chief of Police, Ottawa Service Police

Tuesday, May 31st, 2022: Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Witnesses Included:

• France Bélisle, Mayor, City of Gatineau
• Catherine McKenney, Councillor, City of Ottawa
• Christine Leadman, Executive Director, Bank Street Business Improvement Area
• Claude Royer, Spokesperson, Alexandra Bridge Coalition
• David McRobie, Architect
• Robert Plamondon, Supporters of the Loop

Tuesday, May 17th, 2022: Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Witnesses Included:

• Paul Thompson, Deputy Minister, Public Services and Procurement Canada, Department of Public Works and Government Services
• Rob Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Science and Parliamentary Infrastructure Branch, Department of Public Works and Government Services
• Carson Pardy, Chief Superintendent, Ontario Provincial Police
• Steve Bell, Interim Chief, Ottawa Police Service
• Luc Beaudoin, Director, Service de police de la Ville de Gatineau
• Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Thursday, May 12th, 2022: Main Estimates 2022-23.

Witnesses Included:

• The Right Hon. David Johnston, P.C., C.C., C.M.M., C.O.M., C.D., Commissioner, Leaders' Debates Commission
• Michel Cormier, Executive Director, Leaders' Debates Commission
• Chantal Ouimet, Director of Communications, Leaders' Debates Commission
• Allen Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office
• Sarah Stinson, Director of Operations, Democratic Institutions, Privy Council Office

Tuesday, May 10th, 2022: Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Elections Ballots.

Thursday, May 5th, 2022: Main Estimates 2022-23.

Witnesses Included:

• Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
• Marc Limoges, Chief Financial Officer, Elections Canada
• Susan Torosian, Executive Director, Public Affairs and Civic Education, Elections Canada

Thursday, April 28th, 2022: Main Estimates 2022-23 and Expanding the Federal Jurisdiction for the Operational Security of the Parliamentary Precinct to Include Sections of Wellington St and Sparks St.

Witnesses Included:

• Chris d'Entremont, Deputy Speaker, House of Commons
• Charles Robert, Clerk of the House of Commons, House of Commons
• Michel Patrice, Deputy Clerk, Administration, House of Commons
• Paul St George, Chief Financial Officer, House of Commons
• Larry Brookson, Acting Director/ Officer in Charge of Operations, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Éric Savard, Chief Financial Officer, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Sonia Vani, Chief of Staff, Director's Office of the Parliamentary Protective Service, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Philippe Dufresne, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons
• Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons

Tuesday, April 26th, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Thursday, April 7th, 2022: Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots.

Witnesses Included:

• Jean-François Daoust, Assistant Professor, University of Edinburgh
• Dwight Newman, Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair in Indigenous Rights in Constitutional and International Law, University of Saskatchewan
• Allison Harell, Professor, Political Science Department, Université du Québec à Montréal
• Marjolaine Tshernish, General Manager, Institut Tshakapesh
• Denis Gros-Louis, Director General, First Nations Education Counci

Tuesday, April 5th, 2022: Election of Vice-Chairs and Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots.

• Marie-Hélène Gaudreau was elected Second Vice-Chair of the committee.

Witnesses Included:

• Lori Idlout, M.P., Nunavut
• Stephen Dunbar, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Northwest Territories
• Dustin Fredlund, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Nunavut
• Samantha Mack, Language Assistance Compliance Manager, Alaska Division of Elections

Thursday, March 31st, 2022: Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots and Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Witnesses Included:

• Karliin Aariak, Commissioner, Office of the Languages Commissioner of Nunavut
• Cédric Gray-Lehoux, Spokesperson, First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Youth Network
• Shikuan Vollant, Spokesperson, First Nations of Quebec and Labrador Youth Network
• Aluki Kotierk, President, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated

Tuesday, March 29th, 2022: Inclusion of Indigenous Languages on Federal Election Ballots.

Witnesses Included:

• Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
• Michel Roussel, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Electoral Events and Innovation, Elections Canada
• Anne Lawson, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Regulatory Affairs, Elections Canada
• Karine Morin, Chief of Staff, Elections Canada

Thursday, March 24th, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Tuesday, March 22nd, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Thursday, March 3rd, 2022: Election of Vice-Chairs; Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and; Committee Business

• Kelly Block was elected First Vice-Chair of the committee.

Thursday, February 17th, 2022: Briefing with the Chief Electoral Officer. Witnesses Included:

• Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada
• Michel Roussel, Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Electoral Events and Innovation, Elections Canada

Tuesday, February 15th, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Witnesses Included:

• Anne Dance, Former Director, Parliamentary Internship Programme
• Mary Dawson, Former Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner of Canada
• Shimon Koffler Fogel, President and Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs
• Duff Conacher, Co-Founder, Democracy Watch
• Kathryn Stone, Commissioner, House of Commons, United Kingdom Parliament, Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards
• Paul Thomas, Director, Parliamentary Internship Programme

Thursday, February 10th, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons.

Witnesses Included:

• Charles Robert, Clerk of the House of Commons, House of Commons
• Philippe Dufresne, Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons
• David Phillip Jones, Yukon Conflict of Interest Commissioner, and Northwest Territories Integrity Commissioner, Yukon Legislative Assembly and Northwest Legislative Assembly
• Ariane Mignolet, Ethics and Deontology Commissioner, National Assembly of Quebec
• Hon. J. David Wake, Commissioner, Office of the Integrity Commissioner of Ontario

Tuesday, February 8th, 2022: Briefing on Security Risks for Members of Parliament.

Witnesses Included:

• Patrick McDonell, Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer, House of Commons
• Gregory Dack, Deputy Director, Security Project Management Office and Technical Operations
• Michel Denault, Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Commons
• Larry Brookson, Acting Director, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Julie Hewson, Acting Chief Operations Officer, Parliamentary Protective Service
• Sonia Vani, Chief of Staff, Director's Office of the Parliamentary Protective Service, Parliamentary Protective Service

Thursday, February 3rd, 2022: Review of the Conflict of Interest Code for Members of the House of Commons and Committee Business.

Witnesses Included:

• Mario Dion, Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner

Tuesday, February 1st, 2022: Briefing on Parliament Hill’s Long Term Vision and Plan and Centre Block Rehabilitation and Committee Business.

Witnesses Included:

• Michel Patrice, Deputy Clerk, Administration, House of Commons
• Stéphan Aubé, Chief Information Officer, Digital Services and Real Property, House of Commons
• Darrell de Grandmont, Director, Centre Block Program, House of Commons
• Rob Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Science and Parliamentary Infrastructure Branch, Department of Public Works and Government Services
• Jennifer Garrett, Director General, Centre Block Program, Science and Parliamentary Infrastructure Branch, Department of Public Works and Government Services

Tuesday, December 14th, 2021: Briefing with Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner.

Witnesses Included:

• Mario Dion, Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner

Tuesday, December 7th, 2021: Committee Business.

Friday, December 3rd, 2021: Election of Chair; Election of Vice-Chairs and; Committee Business

• Hon. Bardish Chagger was elected Chair of the committee.
• Eric Duncan was elected First Vice-Chair of the committee.
• Alain Therrien was elected Second Vice-Chair of the committee.

Committee membership

• Chair – Hon.Bardish Chagger (LPC) - Waterloo, ON
• Vice-chair – Kelly Block (CPC) - Carlton Trail – Eagle Creek, SK
• Vice-chair – Marie-Hélène Gaudreau (BQ) - Laurentides – Labelle, QC
• Rachel Blaney (NDP) – North Island – Powell River, BC
• Hon. Greg Fergus (LPC) – Hull – Aylmer, QC
• Mark Gerretsen (LPC) – Kingston And The Islands, ON
• Kelly McCauley (CPC) – Edmonton West, AB
• Sherry Romanado (LPC) – Longueuil – Charles-LeMoyne, QC
• Ruby Sahota (LPC) – Brampton North, ON
• Hon. Andrew Scheer (CPC) – Regina – Qu’Appelle, SK
• Ryan Turnbull (LPC) – Whitby, ON
• Brad Vis (CPC) – Mission-Matsqui-Fraser Canyon, BC

Chair – Hon.Bardish Chagger (LPC) - Waterloo, ON

CSE-related interests

• Ms. Chagger on Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts: “[…] Canada currently has a number of review bodies that examine the activities of specific government organizations engaged in national security operations and report to Parliament, such as the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, and the RCMP's Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. These bodies play an important role in the accountability framework of our three main national security agencies: CSIS, CSE and the RCMP. I would be remiss not to highlight the particularly good work they do in investigating public complaints and ensuring that these these agencies operate lawfully.” (September 2016)
• Ms. Chagger on Bill C-85, An Act to amend the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act and to make related amendments to other Acts: “When our Minister of International Trade Diversification was in Tel Aviv last September, he announced a pilot program to facilitate new cybersecurity solutions for the energy sector that will consider Israeli options to address the needs of Canadian natural gas delivery companies” (February 2019)

Vice-chair – kelly Block (CPC) - Carlton Trail – Eagle Creek, SK

CSE-related interests

• OGGO (May 2020): Kelly Block highlighted the importance to secure critical infrastructure as we shift government operations to digital and telework
  • She asked several questions about Huawei and 5G including, “If Huawei is a part of Canada's 5G network, will it pose a security risk to Canadians?”
• Kelly Block on defence spending, (June 6, 2022): “[…] the budget makes it very clear that the NDP-Liberal government has no plan to increase defence spending to reach the target of 2% of GDP, which Canada committed to as a NATO member.”

Vice-chair – Marie-Hélène Gaudreau (BQ) - Laurentides – Labelle, QC

CSE-related interests

• PROC (May 2022): She expressed the concern over cyber attacks and Elections Canada

Rachel Blaney (NDP) – North Island – Powell River, BC

CSE-related interests

• Rachel Blaney on the invocation of the Emergencies Act (February 2022): “National security threats, which we are now facing, need to be led by our national security force, the RCMP, through the use of the Emergencies Act, which the federal government invoked Monday. They have the strength, intelligence, methods and capability that no single municipality can muster.”
• On NATO’s commitment and Russian threats (NDDN, March 2018): “I think, when you look at NATO's commitment to the implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this is something we have to continue to work on. […] I'm just wondering if you could tell us a little bit about what Canada's role in NATO is around having some really meaningful talks about how we stop this and how we begin that conversation.”

Hon. Greg Fergus (LPC) – Hull – Aylmer, QC

CSE-related interests

• Fergus on open banking (FINA, February 2019): “As you know, open banking is a process that is currently under way, but the framework in which we should try to take a look at it, specifically on the questions of consumer protection, privacy, cybersecurity and the like, hasn't been fully developed.”

Mark Gerretsen (LPC) – Kingston And The Islands, ON

CSE-related interests

• NDDN (2017): He asked whether there was a push-back in CSE to provide more information to the public

Kelly McCauley (CPC) – Edmonton West, AB

CSE-related interests

• McCauley on getting CSE input on security issues (OGGO, November 2020): “How do we change that so that the CSE has input into this, because it's obviously valuable input? You've identified Russia and China, for example, as state-sponsored threats to Canada in the report that came out today. Should we ever be allowing their tech, their state-owned tech, to be in any Government of Canada operations?”
• On Crown corporations and cybersecurity (OGGO, May 2021): “Yes, Crown corporations operate at arm's length, but that being said, for something like cybersecurity, should we have a rethink to bring it under”

Sherry Romanado (LPC) – Longueuil – Charles-LeMoyne, QC

CSE-related interests

• She elaborated on the measures the CRA has put in place for increasing eligibility verification, curbing identity theft, preventing fraud and enhancing cybersecurity. (September 2020)

Ruby Sahota (LPC) – Brampton North, ON

CSE-related interests

• On the Russian invasion in Ukraine (March 2022): “[The invasion] threatens peace and order in Europe and around the world. Canada has made it clear that these unwarranted actions will not go unpunished. We are providing financial aid, cybersecurity support and both lethal and non-lethal equipment, and we have imposed some of the severest sanctions Canada has ever imposed.”
• On cybersecurity and elections (April 2018): “Can you elaborate on what you meant when it comes to detecting and responding to these security concerns, and on how you're working with these agencies in order to make sure that our coming election is not in any way compromised?”

Hon. Andrew Scheer (CPC) – Regina – Qu’Appelle, SK

CSE-related interests

• On 5G networks (June 2020): “Mr. Chair, now that Bell Canada has decided to partner with Ericsson to deliver its 5G network, the Liberals will undoubtedly ban Huawei, but the Liberal inaction on Huawei is just another example of this government's weak leadership. Why couldn't the Prime Minister have shown some backbone and banned Huawei a year ago?”

Ryan Turnbull (LPC) – Whitby, ON

CSE-related interests

• Expressed interest in cybersecurity infrastructure (June 2020): “You also said that the federal government has the cybersecurity infrastructure to do remote online voting for legislative purposes. Can you tell me a little more about what you know about the cybersecurity infrastructure?”

Brad Vis (CPC) – Mission-Matsqui-Fraser Canyon, BC

CSE-related interests

• On Huawei (COVID-19 Pandemic Committee, 2020): “Regarding Canadian interests, when can we expect a decision on Huawei, or should Canadians plan for another delay by the government?”

CSE issue notes

Top cybersecurity points

Foreign interference and cyber threats to democratic process

Cyber security and cyber incidents

Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian cyber threats to Canada

Arctic defence and sovereignty

CSE recruitment and retention

Review and oversight of CSE’s activities

Protecting Canada’s telecommunications systems

Privacy and spyware technology

Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA)