House Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN), Supplementary Estimates C, Chief, Appearance, March 23, 2022

Table of contents

Appearance details

Date: Wednesday, March 23, 2022

Location: Virtual

Time: 3:30 to 5:30 pm

Appearing:

Hon. Anita Anand, P.C., M.P., Minister of National Defence (first hour only)

Supporting:

  • Shelly Bruce, Chief, Communications Security Establishment
  • LGen Allen, Vice-Chief of Defence Staff
  • Bill Matthews, Deputy Minister of National Defence
  • Cheri Crosby, Chief Financial Officer / Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance)
  • Troy Crosby, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
  • Shoba Ranganathan, A/Executive Director, Sexual Misconduct Response Centre (SMRC)

Details: The Minister of National Defence will appear before the House Standing Committee on National Defence to discuss Supplementary Estimates C, 2021-2022.

 

Speaker: MND
Event: Appearance at NDDN for Supplementary Estimates C (Short Version)
Date: March 23, 2022

Introduction

Mister Chair,

Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence,

Je vous remercie pour cette opportunité de discuter du Budget supplémentaire des dépenses C pour le ministère de la Défense nationale, les Forces armées canadiennes et le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications.

Le mois dernier, lorsque j'étais ici pour souligner les engagements de ma lettre de mandat, je vous ai parlé de certains de nos efforts en cours au sein de notre organisation pour défendre le Canada, protéger l'Amérique du Nord et renforcer nos contributions à l'OTAN.

The crisis in Ukraine over the past month has underscored the importance of that work, and of upholding Canada’s military presence across the globe. I had the opportunity to reaffirm and further discuss Canada’s commitments just last week, when I joined my counterparts from all 30 NATO countries during the Extraordinary Defence Ministers Meeting in Brussels.

In the face of our biggest challenges, we must remain engaged internationally with our allies and partners in the name of peace, security, freedom, and democracy, while also safeguarding our own borders and people.

And we recognize that the people that serve in the Canadian Armed Forces are the most valuable and most essential element of Canada’s defence.

The strength of our armed forces comes down to the well-being of those who serve in it. All that we do, from procurement to healthcare to culture change, must be focused on the people who put service before self, the members of our armed forces.

These priorities are reflected in the $673.3 million we are requesting in these Estimates, which is what I am here to discuss today.

Grâce à ce financement, nous allons maintenir nos engagements internationaux, faire d'autres investissements dans nos Forces armées canadiennes, accélérer nos efforts de changement de culture et consolider notre empreinte physique et digitale à travers le pays.

J'aimerais vous parler un peu plus de chacun de ces domaines aujourd'hui.

Support for people

Nos efforts sur la scène mondiale ne sont possibles que grâce à notre personnel qualifié et dévoué des Forces armées canadiennes et au personnel civil qui les soutient dans l'accomplissement de leurs tâches essentielles.

Everywhere I go, in Canada and around the world, people say that they want more Canadian Armed Forces. They want more Canada.

This is one of the reasons why we need to invest in our people. We are only as strong as the people who volunteer to wear a military uniform.

We know our people are at their best when we work to ensure their success and their wellbeing.

Where they are well-supported throughout their entire careers…

Where they receive fair compensation for their work…

And where they feel safe, respected, and protected every single day.

Simply put, our armed forces need to know that Canadians and the government have their back.

Comme nous l'avons vu lors de la pandémie de COVID-dix-neuf (COVID-19), et comme nous le voyons régulièrement lors de catastrophes naturelles, nos forces armées sont là quand nous avons besoin d’elles… nous devons être là quand elles ont besoin de nous.

To that end, we are requesting:

  • $108.9 million to expand long-term disability and life insurance coverage for CAF members
  • $25.6 million towards the CAF’s health care plan
  • $8.5 million to increase compensation for certain occupations within the CAF—including pilots, Special Operations Forces, and Search and Rescue Technicians
  • $6.7 million towards the Restorative Engagement portion of the DND/CAF Sexual Misconduct Class Action Settlement
  • $4.5 million and $3.8 million to address gender—based violence, and expand the reach and service of the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre.

Engaged in the world

To ensure we maintain our much-needed presence in the world, we are requesting funding for several ongoing CAF missions, including:

  • $27.4 million for Operation UNIFIER in Ukraine
  • $65.5 million for Op REASSURANCE in Eastern and central Europe
  • $129.5 million for Op IMPACT in the Middle East
  • And $5.6 million for peace support operations in Africa.

Nous demandons également cent-trois (103) millions de dollars pour soutenir l’Initiative pour la disponibilité opérationnelle de l’OTAN.

Face à l'incertitude mondiale, nous devons maintenir nos solides relations avec nos alliés et nos partenaires aux vues similaires.

Additional funding

Bon nombre des éléments inclus dans ce Budget supplémentaire des dépenses C concernent également l'empreinte physique et digitale de notre organisation.

Plus particulièrement, nous demandons quatre-vingt-deux virgule cinq (82,5) millions de dollars pour moderniser et protéger nos plateformes de gestion de l'information et de technologie.

Cela va nous aider à gagner en efficacité de plusieurs façons, notamment en nous permettant de prendre des décisions plus judicieuses et plus rapides lorsque nous planifions l'avenir.

We’re also requesting:

  • Funding to purchase or upgrade of defence sites across the country, including in Edmonton and at CFB Valcartier.
  • $10 million in un-spent funding carried over for the Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security—or IDEaS—program.
  • Millions of dollars of transfers to and from other government organizations to fund joint efforts; and,
  • An increase of our statutory authorities by $32 million, to sustain legislated items like employee benefit and retirement plans.

Conclusion

Mister Chair, it’s no secret that our organization is facing challenges—within our ranks, and in our efforts to safeguard our country while remaining engaged abroad.

Le financement demandé dans le présent Budget supplémentaire des dépenses C couvre une large gamme de priorités, compte tenu de ces défis.

By approving these requests, we will ensure our people in uniform remain well-positioned, well-supported, and well-equipped in a time of change and uncertainty.

Thank you. Merci. I look forward to your questions.

 

Committee information and potential questions

Standing committee on National Defence 44th Parliament, 1st session

 
Portrait - John Mckay
  • NDDN since 2021 (former NDDN member 2011-13)
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence
Key interests

National defence, human rights

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 1997; re-elected in 2015
Professional background
  • B.A. in Arts from the University of Toronto Scarborough
  • LL.B. from Queen’s University
  • Lawyer
Committee membership
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2021-)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2017 to 2021)
    • Chair, Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
  • Former Vice-Chair on the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2013 to 2015)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2011 to 2013)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2015 to 2017)
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance (2003 to 2005)
  • Former Critic for National Defence (2011-2013), Environment (2013 to 2015), Industry (2008 to 2009), and Treasury Board (2006 to 2007)
  • Co-Chair of the Canada-US Interparliamentary Group (2021-)
  • Chair of the Canada-UK Interparliamentary Group (2020-)
  • Counsellor of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Canadian Branch of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2021-)
Points of interest to CSE
  • One of the few Government-side MPs who voted in favour of the CPC’s Opposition Motion in November 2020, which called on the Government to make a decision on the Huawei Ban
  • During SECU’s study of Bill C-59 asked what contributions the Bill would make to address cyber threats to private infrastructure
  • Public Safety Committee, December 2020: McKay expressed concern surrounding the lack of clarity for reporting cyber incidents for Canadians
Other interests
  • Human rights, trade, unions, law
 
 
Portrait - Kerry-Lynne D. Findlay
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Shadow Minister for National Defence
Key interests

CAF support, small businesses, law

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2011, re-elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Studied history, political science and law at the University of British Columbia
  • Completed advanced courses at Harvard Law School and Rotman’s School of Management in Toronto
  • Established a law practice in Vancouver
  • Established her own law firm, KFindlay Law Group, in 2019
  • Served as a BC appointee on the Delta Police Board
Committee membership
  • Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021-)
  • Vice-Chair of the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying (2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (2020 to 2021)
  • Vice-Chair and Member of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2020)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Shadow Minister for National Defence (2021-)
  • Shadow Minister for Environment and Climate Change (2019 to 2020)
  • Minister of National Revenue (2013 to 2015)
  • Associate Minister of National Defence (2013)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice (2011 to 2013)
  • Member on the: Canada-China Legislative Association (2021), Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2021), Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2021), Canada-Unites States Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canada-United Kingdom Interparliamentary Association (2021), and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • At the Committee of the Whole (Supplementary Estimates B), Dec 2021: Posed a question to Minister Joly showing concern over Canada not being a part of the new Three Eyes Partnership with the US, UK and Australia.
  • COVID-19 Pandemic Committee, May 2020: Posed question showing concern over the government partnering with a Chinese company backed by the Chinese military to conduct research into COVID-19. Showed concern that the Chinese military has been accused of trying to hack research data by our own intelligence agencies.
Other interests
  • CAF/military support, small businesses, law
 
 
Portrait - Christine Normandin
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Law, immigration and refugees

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Obtained Bachelor’s of Science in Biomedical Sciences in 2006
  • Appointed lawyer in 2015, eventually specializing in international family law and child abduction
  • Sat on the Board of Directors of the École secondaire Marcellin-Champagnat and was president of the Bloc Québécois Political Commission
  • Named Volunteer of the Year 2018 by the Young Bar Association of Montreal for the hours she devoted to helping citizens prepare for their court hearings
Committee membership
  • Vice-Chair for the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Vice-Chair for the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2020 to 2021)
  • Former Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) (2020)

Political and parliamentary roles

  • National Defence Critic for the Bloc Québécois (2021-)
  • Deputy House Leader of the Bloc Québécois (2019-)
  • Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Critic for the Bloc Québécois (2019 to 2021)
Points of interest to CSE
  • Canada-China Relations Committee, May 2021: Concerned over Canada’s “laxed” stance on Huawei in comparison to the other Five Eyes partners
  • Business of Supply- Government Orders, February 2021: Concern of China’s mass surveillance regime and the surveillance capacities of Huawei
Other interests
  • Law, immigration and refugees, international students
 
 
Portrait - Todd Doherty
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Veterans and CAF issues

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former aviation executive, serving as a top aviation business development professional
  • Promoted regional, provincial and national passenger, cargo and tourism opportunities
  • Small business owner
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Vice-Chair of Standing Committee on Procedural and House Affairs since 2020
    • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
  • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (2020)
  • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (2017 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Deputy Shadow Minister for National Defence (2021-)
  • Special Advisor on Mental Health and Wellness in Shadow Cabinet (2020-)
  • Former Critic for Transport and Former Critic for Fisheries and Oceans
  • Member of the Parliamentary Associations of Canada-Europe, Canada-Africa, NATO, ParlAmericas, the Canada Group of Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the Inter-Parliamentary Groups of Canada-United States, Canada-Germany, Canada-Ireland, Canada-Israel, Canada-Italy, Canada-Japan and the Canada-China Legislative Association (2020)
Points of interest to CSE
  • CACN, 2020: Spoke on China-Canadian relations with respect to Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and a request to invite Ambassador Barton to appear before committee
Other interests
  • Championed Bill C-211, An Act Respecting a Federal Framework on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
  • At-risk youth, Crisis intervention, opioid crisis, mental health, veterans, CAF
 
 
Portrait - Darren Fisher
  • NDDN since 2016
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Seniors
Key interests

Economic development, National Pharmacare, CAN-NATO relations

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former small business owner and community volunteer
  • Elected to Halifax Regional Council in 2009 and 2012, and elected as Deputy Mayor in 2014
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-), and (2016 to 2019)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Health (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2017 to 2019)
  • Member of the House Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2016 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Seniors (2021-)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Economic Development and Official Languages (2021)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health (2019 to 2021)
  • Counsellor for the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2020)
  • Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group and the Canada-United Kingdom Interparliamentary Association (2018 to 2019), and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • NDDN Committee, Briefing by the Commissioner of CSE, March 2017: Concern over other Five Eyes partners not keeping their promise to protect Canadian data and spy on each other’s citizens
  • NDDN Committee, Canada’s Involvement in NATO, January 2018: Concern over if Canadian and NATO infrastructure is safe from data breaches and if there is a quick response to new cyber threats
Other interests
  • Pharmacare, environmental issues, mental health, literacy and poverty
 
 
Portrait - Cheryl Gallant
  • NDDN since 2001
Key interests

Cyber security, Op IMPACT, BMD, CFB Petawawa is in her riding

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2000
Professional background
  • B.SC. in Chemistry from the University of Western Ontario
  • Chief Administrative Director for a family-owned small business/professional practice
  • Chairperson of the City of Pembroke Downtown Development Commission
  • Member of the Economic Advisory Committee for Pembroke
  • Former researcher with the University of Toronto on biochemistry
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2006-)
    • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2016 to 2017)
  • Former Member of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (2014 to 2015)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former Deputy House Leader of the Official Opposition
  • Member of the Canada-China Legislative Association (2021)
  • Director of Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Shadow Cabinet Minister for Veterans Affairs and Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario (2019 to 2020)
  • Vice-Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2006-)
  • Several Parliamentary Associations including Canada-China Legislative Association, Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, and Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly
Points of interest to CSE
  • E-security” is a popular topic for Gallant. Issues of greatest interest in this area include:
    • Cybersecurity of the electricity grid; NATO and NORAD and cybersecurity, including IoT and AI; recruiting cybersecurity experts into the military; how CSE works with the private sector; information sharing in the Five Eyes; Russian cyberattacks against Georgia
Other interests
  • Op IMPACT, CFB Petawawa is in her riding, Ballistic Missile Defence, peacekeeping
 
 
Portrait - Lindsay Mathyssen
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Racial equality, affordable childcare, gender equality

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Studied English and Political Science at Queens University
  • Studied non-profit management at Western University
  • Worked in various assistant roles for four MPs over the past 11 years
  • Succeeding her mother, Irene Mathyssen, who is retiring after serving on Parliament Hill for 12 years
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women (2020 to 2021)
    • Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (2020 to 2021)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Deputy Critic for Women and Gender Equality (2021-)
  • Critic for National Defence for the New Democratic Party (2021-)
  • NDP Deputy House Leader (2021-)
  • Member of the Executive on the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020-)
  • Member of the Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group, Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2021-)
Points of interest to CSE
  • NIL
Other interests
  • Gender equality, affordable childcare, racial equality
 
Portrait - Bryan May
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence
Key interests

Veterans affairs, community activism

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • BA, University of Waterloo
  • Senior management of various non-profit organizations
  • Executive Treasurer of the Social Planning Council of Cambridge and North Dumfries
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020 to 2021)
    • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources (2020 to 2021)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (2015 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2021-)
  • Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2018 to 19), Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2018 to 19), Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Group (2018 to 19), Canada-China Legislative Association (2016 to 17), and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • NIL
Other interests
  • Community activism, veterans affairs, Sponsor of Bill C-272, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act: C-272 gives a small amount of control back to the consumer and will allow provinces to create their own right-to-repair legislation. This bill completed its second reading in June 2021
 
Portrait - Glen Motz
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests
  • Seniors, gun control, health care, rural crime
Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2016 (by-election)
Professional background
  • Attended Hillcrest Christian College
  • Began a policing career with the Medicine Hat Police Service
  • Received several awards including the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Former Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) (2020)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2017-)
  • Former Member of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (2017)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Shadow Cabinet Minister for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Associate) (2019 to 20)
  • Former Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Member of the Canadian Section of the ParlAmericas, Member of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group and several others (2017 to 2018)
Points of interest to CSE
  • INDU, May 2020: CSE appearance
    • Interest in levels of fraud and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre
    • Asked Scott Jones about front-line health workers being a target of fraud of cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic
    • Asked Scott Jones about intellectual property theft through cyberattacks and espionage
    • Interest in Chinese state-sponsored actors and foreign influenced activities
Other interests
  • Law enforcement, rural crime, seniors, gun control, health care
 
Portrait - Jennifer O’connell
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities
Key interests

Infrastructure investments, climate change, affordable childcare

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Studied Political Science at the University of Toronto
  • Worked at a law firm specializing in labour law
  • Served as a City Councillor, Regional Councillor and Deputy Mayor in Pickering
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Health (2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2021)
  • Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (2020 to 21)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Finance (2017 to 18)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Finance (2016 to 2018)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities (2021-)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health (2021)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance (2018 to 19)
  • Previously Member on Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • Question Period, May 2021: In relation to the two Chinese scientists fired at the Microbiology Laboratory, O’Connell gave assurance that Canada takes threats to research security and intellectual property very seriously
  • House Debate, Petitions, October 2020: Concern of Huawei telecommunications in Canada and how it will affect Canada’s relationship with the Five Eyes allies.
    • Also showed concern over Canada’s autonomy and the Chinese government having access to our intelligence through Huawei networks
Other interests
  • Affordable childcare, infrastructure investments, climate change
 
 
Portrait - Yves Robillard
  • NDDN since 2017
Key interests

Arctic security, NATO, Russia and Ukraine, veterans affairs

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former teacher
  • Former Chief of Staff to the President of the National Assembly of Quebec
  • Former Commander in Squadron 21 of the RCAF Reserve
  • Former Chief of Personnel for the Air Cadet Camp of Bagotville Military Base
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2017-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020-)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs (2018-2019)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (2016 to 2018)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2016 to 2019)
  • Former Member of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2017)
Points of interest to CSE
  • NDDN February 2019: During Chief Shelly Bruce’s appearance before NDDN asked about what CSE is doing to “protect our elections”
  • NDDN, November 2018: During Chief Shelly Bruce’s appearance before asked how CSE “will play a key role in the [Cyber Centre]”
  • NDDN March 2017: During OCSEC’s appearance asked about bilingualism at CSE
Other interests
  • In NDDN committee, he asked questions about Arctic security, Canada’s role in NATO, hybrid warfare, peacekeeping, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine
  • Indigenous affairs, international relations, seniors, veterans
 
 
Portrait - Sven Spengemann
  • NDDN since 2016
Key interests

Iraq, CAF. security, public safety, Cyber threat mitigation

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Obtained LL.B. from Osgoode Hall Law School
  • Doctorate from Harvard Law School (SJD)
  • Worked as a Senior Policy Analyst in the Privy Council Office
  • Served as a senior UN official in Baghdad with the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. In Iraq, he negotiated operational protocols with the US Coalition Forces to ensure operational, security and medical support for the UN Mission
  • Led a team of international and Iraqi experts to assist the Iraqi Parliament and Kurdistan Regional government with constitutional and legislative reforms
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020-)
    • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2016 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Co-Chair of the Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Member of the Executive on the Canadian Group of the Interparliamentary Union (2020-)
  • Member of the Canada-China Legislative Association, Canada-Germany Interparliamentary Group, Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group, Canadian NATO ParliamentaryAssociation, Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • In favour of Bill C-59 and spoke a great deal in April 2018 on clarifying the purpose and importance of the Bill to other members of Parliament
  • January 2019: Concern of financial cyber fraud and if there is anything else the government can do to examine more closely
  • Speaks multiple times on the importance of small businesses using the CCCS to develop good cyber infrastructure
  • September 2018: Asked multiple questions on the state on Russia-China relations and China’s geopolitical interests
  • May 2016: Question pertaining to CSE’s powers on gathering information with respect to an individual who holds dual citizenship
Other interests
  • Human rights, gender equality, UN missions, institutional design, China-Russia relations
 

Mandate

NDDN studies the legislation, activities and expenditures of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed forces. It also examines the domestic, continental, and international security environment.

Appearances

  • February 9, 2022: CSE appeared alongside the Minister of National Defence and other senior officials to discuss the Minister’s mandate letter and priorities.
  • Fbruary 7, 2022: CSE appeared alongside the Director of CSIS, to brief NDDN members’ situational awareness of the threats they themselves face from foreign interference, as well as a discussion of the threats Canada faces from foreign interference.
  • November 2, 2020: CSE appeared alongside the inister of National Defence and other senior officials to speak on Main Estimates, 2020-2021.

Key studies

  • Notable activities/meetings:
    • Briefing by the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment (March 2017)
    • Briefing on the Ongoing Activities of the Communications Security Establishment (May 2016)
  • Studies in recent years:
    • threat analysis affecting Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces’ operational readiness to meet those threats
    • addressing sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces
    • impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Canadian Armed Forces operations
    • diversity within the Canadian Armed Forces
    • Canada’s contributions to international peacekeeping

Previous meetings (current session)

Wednesday, February 16, 2022: Threat analysis affecting Canada and the CAF operational readiness (Meeting 3).

  • Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, President, World Refugee and Migration Council
  • Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, MacDonald-Laurier Institute
  • Richard B. Fadden
  • J. Paul de B. Taillon, private academic

Monday, February 14, 2022: Threat analysis affecting Canada and the CAF operational readiness (Meeting 2).

  • Andrew Rasiulis, Fellow, Canadian Affairs Institute
  • Elbridge A. Colby, Principle and Co-Founder, The Marathon Initiative
  • Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College and Queen’s University
  • Colin Robertson, Senior Advisor and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Wednesday, February 9, 2022: Briefing by the Minister of National Defence on her mandate letter.

  • Shelly Bruce, Chief, CSE
  • The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence
  • Bill Matthews, Deputy Minister of National Defence
  • Gen Wayne D. Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces
  • Col Robin Holman, Acting Judge Advocate General, Office of the Judge Advocate General

Monday, February 7, 2022: Briefing by CSIS and CSE.

  • Dan Rogers, Associate Chief, CSE
  • Rajiv Gupta, Associate Head, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
  • David Vigneault, Director, CSIS
  • Cherie Henderson, Assistant Director, Requirements, CSIS

Wednesday, February 2, 2022: Threat analysis affecting Canada and the CAF operational readiness.

  • Pierre Jolicoeur, Associate Vice-Principal Research, Military College of Canada
  • Ihor Michalchyshyn, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer at Ukrainian Canadian Congress
  • David Mulroney, Former Ambassador of Canada to the People’s Republic of China
  • David Perry, President, Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Monday, January 31, 2022: Committee business

Wednesday, December 15, 2021: Election of Chair

The Honorable John McKay (LPC) was elected Chair. The Honorable Kerry-Lynne D. Findlay (CPC) was elected first vice-chair; Christine Normandin (BQ) was elected second vice-chair.

 

Estimates questions

1. How does the Government evaluate how much we are spending on cyber security and whether it is enough funding?
  • The Government of Canada spent $791M on cyber security (based on Budget 2021).
  • The global threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Cyber incidents, including significant critical infrastructure incidents, are increasing in number and sophistication.
  • This means that Canada must continue to stay ahead of advances in cyber tools and maintain leading-edge technological capabilities.
  • In order to respond to this challenge, it is critical that the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is positioned to lead the national response to these rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, and that it has the adequate resources to do so.

Foreign interference

2. Are Chinese or Russian state-sponsored actors attempting to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure?
  • CSE has assessed that state-sponsored programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea all pose threats to Canada.
  • CSE has also assessed that it’s very likely that state-sponsored actors are attempting to develop capabilities that could disrupt critical infrastructure, such as the supply of electricity.
  • These actors may also continue to target our critical infrastructure to collect information, position for future activity or intimidate.
  • But CSE assess it is unlikely that actors will use cyber activities to disrupt or harm critical infrastructure outside conflict scenarios.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.
3. There have been allegations of foreign interference targeting Conservative Party of Canada candidates. What is being done to protect members of parliament?
  • We are aware of such coverage, however, SITE and its members cannot disclose the precise nature of any of their investigations due to national security reasons.
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre worked closely with Elections Canada to help secure election systems and infrastructure. This included providing advice and guidance to candidates and parties for best cyber security practices during the election period.
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre also created a hotline for Canadians to call for any further questions they may have about cyber security. This hotline is 1-833-CYBER-88.
  • During the 2021 election, the Government of Canada did not detect state sponsored foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, and that warranted public communication, as determined by the Panel under the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.
  • The Government of Canada remains vigilant, thoroughly investigates potential matters of foreign interference, and will take proper action to address threats to Canada’s democratic institutions when and if required.
4. Has there been any observable change of cyber intrusions or attempts of intrusions due to the COVID-19 pandemic from foreign state-sponsored actors?
  • CSE continues to advise the government on cyber threats and incidents.
  • The bulk of malicious threat activity that CSE has observed during the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be criminal in nature, and CSE is working with the appropriate partners to address such activity. For example, CSE has issued alerts and cyber security advice about COVID-related phishing campaigns.
  • CSE assesses that foreign intelligence agencies will almost certainly continue to use their cyber capabilities to pursue intelligence related to COVID-19 medical research and intellectual property. Intellectual property, especially related to vaccine development, treatments, COVID-19 testing, and medical devices such as ventilators or personal protective equipment (PPE), would offer public health, economic, and national security benefits.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.
5. Has there been an increase in commercial espionage against Canadian organizations from state-sponsored actors?
  • State-sponsored actors will certainly continue to conduct espionage against Canadian businesses, academic or governments to steal intellectual property or proprietary information.
  • Protecting Canadians’ intllectual property remains a huge priority for CSE and its Cyber Centre.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a lng way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.

Cyber security

6. What support has CSE or its Cyber Centre provided to GAC in response to the recent cyber attacks on their network?
  • Government of Canada partners are working together in response to this recent cyber incident. CSE is Canada’s technical lead for cyber security, and we worked closely with Global Affairs Canada on the incident.
  • At this time, there is no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident. Canada’s cyber resilience remains strong.
  • As this investigation is ongoing, I cannot comment further on the incident.
  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur.
7. What support has CSE provided to Newfoundland in response to the cyberattack?
  • CSE, and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, are working closely with Federal partners and Province of Newfoundland and Labrador authorities to assist with their cyber incident response.
  • Cyber Centre officials have been in contact with provincial authorities since the beginning and have provided incident support and mitigation services.

The National Cyber Threat Assessment report

8. What is the National Cyber Threat Assessment report? What information does it include?
  • The Cyber Centre produces a report every two years outlining the greatest threats Canada faces.
  • On November 18, the Cyber Centre released the National Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2020, an update to its previous 2018 report.
  • The NCTA 2020 provides an update to the 2018 National Cyber Threat Assessment with an analysis of the interim years and forecasts looking ahead to 2022.
  • The key judgements in this report are based on reporting from multiple sources, including classified and unclassified information. The judgements are based on the Cyber Centre’s knowledge and expertise in cyber security and informed by CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate, which provides us with valuable insights on cyber threat activity around the world.
9. What are the primary concerns and observations made in the report?
  • The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 highlights 4 key observations:
    • First, cyber-crime is the most likely threat to impact Canadians now and in the years ahead;
    • Second, cybercriminals often succeed in their work because they exploit human and social behaviours;
    • Third, ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
    • Finally, while cybercrime is the main threat, state-sponsored cyber programs of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran pose a strategic threat to Canada.

Huawei and 5G

10. Our Five Eyes partners have made decisions on Huawei and their 5G networks. When will Canada make a decision on Huawei?
  • While we cannot comment on specific companies, the Government has been conducting an examination of emerging 5G technology and the associated security and economic considerations.
  • As the Prime Minister noted, there will be a decision on the 5G security review “in due course”.
  • We continue to work with partners and other agencies to mitigate risks stemming from designated equipment and services, including Huawei, being used in Canadian 3G, 4G, and LTE telecommunication networks.
11. Does CSE have any concerns about the social media app Tik Tok or WeChat?
  • CSE's Cyber Centre is not a regulatory agency and as such does not endorse or ban social media applications.
  • It is important for Canadians to adopt good cyber security practices – which CSE shares on the cyber.gc.ca website.

CSE activities and COVID-19

12. What is the Government doing to counter misinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic?
  • Cyber threat actors are using fake websites, imitating health agencies or government departments, to spread disinformation or to defraud Canadians.
  • In response, CSE is helping to identify and take down these kinds of malicious websites.
  • In coordinately with industry partners, CSE has contributed to the removal of more than 10,000 fraudulent sites or email addresses, including those pretending to be the Public Health Agency and the Canada Revenue Agency.
  • CSE also continues to provide critical foreign intelligence to inform decisions on Canada’s approach to COVID-19.
13. Has CSE dealt with any compromises of our own research organizations?
  • CSE is aware of incidents of malicious threat activities directed at Canadian health research organizations and continues to offer cyber security support and sharing of threat related information to limit any potential impacts to targeted organizations.
  • CSE recommends that all Canadian health and research organizations remain vigilant and apply best practices in cyber security. Such practices include monitoring network logs, remaining alert to suspicious emails and calls, and keeping servers and critical systems patched for all known security vulnerabilities.
  • While CSE cannot speak on any specific incidents, CSE is working with Canadian health care and research sectors, and other partners and industries, as appropriate.
  • We encourage all Canadian organizations to adopt strong cyber security practices, which CSE shares on our website: cyber.gc.ca.
14. What has CSE done specifically to reduce the risks that Canadian research and development efforts could be compromised, specific points about what we are doing with Canadian universities, GC science departments, and the private sector?
  • CSE, in collaboration with CSIS, continues to engage with all of these entities to provide threat briefings. CSE, through the Cyber Centre, has published practical steps organizations can proactively take to protect themselves. These are all available online. This is in addition to alerts and advisories published regularly to draw attention to security vulnerabilities or issues.
  • Further, when CSE sees malign foreign cyber activities it have both alerted the victims and assisted with recovery but also, with its colleagues around government and its allies, publicly attributed this activity as seen this past year.
  • More recently we have been working with ISED to assess the cyber security posture for recipients of strategic innovation funds but it is important to note that all of the advice and guidance is publicly available for all Canadian organizations.
 

Media lines

  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act (the CSE Act) sets out five aspects of our mandate: cyber security and information assurance; foreign intelligence; defensive cyber operations; active cyber operations; and technical and operation assistance. We use our technical expertise in all five aspects of our mandate. We do so to keep Canadians safe and secure
  • CSE’s foreign signals intelligence program provides Canada’s senior decision-makers with insights into the activities, motivations, capabilities, and intentions of foreign adversaries, and the international readiness and foreign reactions to a variety of diverse global events
  • CSE’s intelligence reporting also identifies hostile state activities, and the CSE Act authorizes us to assist the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
  • We support Canadian military operations and protect forces deployed abroad through advanced cyber techniques. For example, CSE could protect Canadian forces by disrupting an adversary’s ability to communicate or providing intelligence regarding an imminent threat
  • The CSE Act gives CSE the legal authority to conduct cyber operations to disrupt foreign-based threats to Canada. This includes active cyber operations to degrade, disrupt, respond to, or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign individuals, states, and organizations
  • If there are reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign state or actor constitutes a threat to the security of Canada and/or Canadian military forces, we are prepared to take appropriate action to address the threat
  • We continue to provide the Government of Canada with the most comprehensive information available related to Canada’s intelligence priorities, directly furthering Canadian safety, security, and prosperity
 
  • While we can’t speak about specific operations, our increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats
 
  • Cyber security is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges countries face
  • Canada engages internationally to promote and protect a free, open, and secure cyberspace
  • The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day
  • Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information
  • CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) remain committed to working with domestic and international security and intelligence partners to maintain the open, reliable, and secure use of cyberspace
  • On Wednesday, January 19, 2022, CSE’s Cyber Centre published a cyber threat bulletin urging Canadian critical infrastructure operators to raise awareness and take mitigations against Russian-backed cyber threat activity
    • CSE’s most recent cyber security bulletin is a proactive advisory for Canadian critical infrastructure operators urging them to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive network monitoring and mitigations
    • It is further intended to raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology
  • The Cyber Centre published an Alert on January 17, 2022, outlining ‘Wiper malware’ being used to target Ukrainian organizations
If pressed on release date of threat bulletin and GAC cyber incident
  • Cyber threats are persistent. CSE issues security threat bulletins and cyber alerts on a regular basis. CSE's cyber security bulletin released on January 19th followed similar bulletins released by US and UK partners to understand and mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure.

Opposition statements on Canada’s support to Ukraine

  • The Conservative Party of Canada continues to criticize Canada’s response to Ukraine’s call for aid. They argue that the government should be providing lethal weapons, and the contribution to date is inadequate. Opposition Leader Erin O’Toole has asked if Canada is a friend and ally of Ukraine and said the country is missing in action
  • New Democratic Party leader Jagmeet Singh opposed sending weapons to Ukraine, and focused on the humanitarian toll of Russia’s actions to date. Singh told the House of Commons that Canada should focus its efforts on diplomacy and “non-lethal assistance. Bloodshed must be avoided through international pressure and stronger sanctions.”
  • The Bloc Quebecois said Canada is doing nothing but “crying wolf” and not trying to directly engage with Russian President Vladirmir Putin

Cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada

  • On January 24th, the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they are working with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a recent cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
  • The cyber incident was detected on January 19, after which mitigation actions were taken
  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur
  • This investigation is ongoing. We are unable to comment further on any specific details for operational reasons
  • Our cyber defence and incident response teams work 24/7 to identify compromises and alert potential victims within the federal government and Canadian critical infrastructure. In the wake of a cyber incident, the incident response team offers advice and support to contain the threat and mitigate any potential harm
  • We are constantly reviewing measures to protect Canadians and our critical infrastructure from electronic threats, hacking, and cyber espionage. We encourage all government and non-government partners to use cyber security best practices
Draft Statement - Update on GAC cyber incident

The Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), can confirm they continue to work with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a recent cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

Equally important to note, there continues to be no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.

The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day.

Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information.

We urge Canadians and Canadian organizations to remain vigilant and to visit Cyber.gc.ca and getcybersafe.gc.ca for tips on how to stay secure online.

Media articles

National Post – Canada’s foreign affairs department targeted in significant cyber attack

January 24, 2022

Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department was the target of a significant cyber attack last week, on the same day the country’s cyber defence agency warned of Russian-backed cyber threats.

The federal government confirmed on Monday that it was responding to a “cyber incident” that was first detected on Jan. 19 targeting Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

The statement also confirmed that Canada’s digital defence and spy agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security is investigating the incident.

On the same evening the cyber attack on GAC was detected, CSE put out a threat bulletin warning Canadian organizations — particularly “critical infrastructure” providers — of the possibility of attacks from Russian-backed cyber threat actors.

“Canada’s Cyber Centre… is aware of foreign cyber threat activities, including by Russian-backed actors, to target Canadian critical infrastructure network operators, their operational and information technology,” the agency said.

The bulletin made no mention of an incident involving the Canadian government, and it is unclear if the warning had anything to do with the cyber attack targeting GAC.

A similar warning published by the U.S. in the same week warned of Russian-backed hackers trying to attack government organizations.

Global News – Global Affairs Canada suffers cyber attack amid Russia-Ukraine tensions: sources

January 24, 2022

Global Affairs Canada is scrambling to recover after a multi-day network disruption that security and government sources describe as a “cyber attack.”

While neither Global Affairs nor Canada’s cyber security agency, the Communications Security Establishment, could immediately comment, sources tell Global News the government is concerned the attack was conducted by Russia or Russian-backed hackers.

“GAC has been the target of a cyber attack but it is not clear if the Russians, the alleged perpetrators, hacked into the system or were able to merely disrupt its service,” a national security source, who spoke on the condition they not be named, told Global News.

Late Wednesday evening, the CSE published an updated cyber threat bulletin warning Canadian organizations to bolster their defences.

“(The CSE) is aware of foreign cyber threat activities, including by Russian-backed actors, to target Canadian critical infrastructure network operators, their operational and information technology,” the bulletin read.

When asked if the bulletin was issued in response to a spike in observed cyber-attacks, including by Russian-backed actors, a spokesperson for CSE told Global News they could not discuss the matter for “operational security reasons.”

But the CSE said the bulletin was partially an attempt to “raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology.”

It’s unlikely that Global Affairs missed the memo. The department works closely with the CSE, given the agency’s mandate to collect foreign intelligence and launch cyber attacks against foreign adversaries.

The CSE’s warning also referenced its assessment, made in 2021, that foreign-backed hackers have made incursions into Canadian critical infrastructure, manufacturing, health and energy networks. The agency assessed it unlikely that foreign states would attempt to disrupt those critical sectors “in the absence of international hostilities.”

CBC News - Anand meets with Ukraine’s defence minister as country braces for possible invasion

January 31, 2022

Defence Minister Anita Anand got an updated assessment of Ukraine's military needs during a meeting with the embattled country's defence minister Monday.

Ukraine appears to have given her a clear assessment of its needs. Anand said she needs to take that list back to cabinet.

"It would be prudent in light of the very intense and sensitive security situation at the current time to discuss that first with my counterparts in cabinet and with the prime minister," Anand said.

Anand said that, while she couldn't get into specifics, she and Reznikov "discussed cyber security in particular and how important it is to make sure cyber networks are secure."

The Ukrainian government was hit by a massive cyber attack recently. Canada's current aid package includes a promise to share with Ukraine the expertise of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada's signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency.

Global Affairs Canada also was hit by a massive cyber attack a week ago, while Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly was conducting a round of diplomacy in Ukraine. Federal officials have not pointed the finger at Russia or at Moscow-backed private hackers.

Anand, who is the minister responsible for CSE, wasn't prepared to assign blame when asked about it Monday, saying only that she remains concerned about Canada's cyber defences.

Toronto star – Ottawa debating sending more troops to eastern Europe and weapons to Ukraine

The Liberal government said it is weighing Ukraine’s request to send more money and weapons, and looking at deploying more troops to NATO operations in eastern Europe.

Defence Minister Anita Anand told reporters in Ukraine that “we are definitely considering the further support that we can provide in this area. Decisions are ongoing,” Anand said.

Anand told reporters cabinet is considering the request from Ukraine’s government for weapons. “The issue is not off the table,” she said. “We will continue to monitor the evolving and fluid situation and make decisions accordingly.” Anand underscored that Ukraine has recognized the importance of the Canadian training mission, and its leader Lieut.-Col. Luc Gilbert said “that Ukraine wants more of us.”

On Monday she said that her talks with Ukraine’s defence minister Oleksii Reznikov “discussed cyber security in particular, and how important it is to make sure that cyber networks are secure.”

Last week, Trudeau offered more intelligence and cyber support to Ukraine.

A spokesman for the foreign intelligence agency, Communications Security Establishment, said CSE “has unique technical and operational capabilities” and the legal authority to assist the Canadian Forces with “technical and operational assistance” in support of military missions such as Operation UNIFIER, the name given to the Ukraine mission.

This support includes intelligence sharing, cyber security, and cyber operations,” said CSE spokesman Evan Koronewski, declining to discuss specifics. “This increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats.

 

CSE's supplementary estimates C 2021-22 specific issue notes

Overview note: CSE's supplementary estimates 2021-22

Speaking notes

  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is one of Canada’s key security and intelligence agencies and the lead federal technical authority for cyber security
  • The CSE provides valuable foreign intelligence to inform the Government of Canada’s decision making and protect national security
  • Its sophisticated cyber and technical expertise also helps identify, prepare for, and defend against threats to Canada and its cyber systems and networks
  • While conducting these activities, CSE respects the highest standards of lawfulness, ethics, values and the protection of the privacy of Canadians
  • CSE’s 2021-22 Supplementary Estimates (C) (SEC) includes total funding of $16.4M

Details

Line items included in CSE's 2021-22 SEC

  • Extending Canada’s Middle East strategy ($4.8M):
    • $4.0M composed of Personnel ($2.9M) and Operating ($1.1M)
    • $0.8M for Statutory Employee Benefit Plan (EBP)
  • Interdepartmental transfers:
    • From Shared Services Canada ($9.7M)
    • From Department of National Defence ($2.3M)
    • From CSE to Treasury Board Secretariat ($13.3K)
    • From CSE to Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development ($384.9K)

Details: Funding included in CSE's 2021-22 SEC

Extending Canada's Middle East strategy: $4.8M

CSE will use this funding to contribute to Canada’s Middle East Strategy which supports security and stabilization efforts, development assistance and diplomatic engagement for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. CSE provides foreign intelligence support to the CAF mission.

Transfer from Shared Services Canada to CSE: $9.7M

This funding will be used for CSE’s cyber security contributions to the following projects:

  • $3.6M for National Capital Region Regional Communication Hub upgrades
  • $3.5M for the Security Information and Event Management Project (SIEM
  • $2.6M for the Secure Communications for National Leadership project (SCNL)
Transfer from Department of National Defence to CSE: $2.3M

This funding includes information management and information technology support services to the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG).

Transfer from CSE to Treasury Board Secretariat: ($13.3K)

This funding includes:

  • $5.0K to support the Capacity Accelerator Project at the Office of the Comptroller General to support the public service audit community
  • $8.3K for Financial Community Developmental Programs and the Inclusion, Diversity, Equity and Accessibility initiative
Transfer from CSE to Department of Foreign Afairs, Trade and Development: ($384.9K)

This funding includes fees for GAC to administer CSE personnel overseas.

GAC is a common service provider for Government of Canada operations abroad and receives compensation for the increased cost of operations resulting from staff being posted at Canadian missions and liaison offices by other government departments.

Line item: Extending Canada's Middle East strategy

  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) provides valuable foreign intelligence to protect national security
  • CSE is receiving $4.8M in these estimates to contribute to Canada’s Middle East Strategy
  • The Strategy supports security and stabilization efforts, development assistance and diplomatic engagement for Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan
  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities. CSE provides foreign intelligence support to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mission

Line item: Transfer from Shared Services Canada (SSC) to CSE

  • Shared Services Canada (SSC) is transferring $9.7M to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in these Estimates to support the Government of Canada’s needs access to modern and reliable digital communications, and the Government’s ability to provide secure digital services
  • This funding will be used for CSE’s cyber security contributions to the following projects:
    • National Capital Region Regional Communication Hub upgrades
    • The Security Information and Event Management Project (SIEM)
    • The Secure Communications for National Leadership project (SCNL)

Details

National Capital Region regional communication hub
  • To support federal government employees working from home, SSC is making upgrades to its infrastructure and services, including through the establishment of Regional Communication Hubs
    • Regional Communication Hubs are meant to decentralise Internet and cloud access for the GC and to be geographically distributed across the country
    • Rather than routing all GC network traffic through the National Capital Region, the Regional Communication Hubs will bring cloud and Internet services closer to the user high-quality user experience is ensured through a high-performance direct path to applications and services
  • Efforts are underway to add more Regional Communication Hubs which will improve GC accessibility to the Internet and cloud services
The Security Information and Event Management project (SIEM)

The Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) provides a single view of IT security incidents across Government of Canada systems. This project will renew the existing SIEM infrastructure, and expand and customize the processing of security logs from the Enterprise Data Centres (EDCs). Once implemented, the improved functionalities will enable the Government of Canada to predict, detect and respond to cyber threats and risks to IT systems and infrastructure.

The Secure Communications for National Leadership project (SCNL)

The Secure Communications for National Leadership (SCNL) Project is a joint PCO, CSE and SSC initiative that enables a modern, mobile and secure means of communications for Ministers and senior officials classified up to SECRET.

Line item: Transfer from DND to CSE

  • In these Estimates, National Defence is transferring $2.3 million to the Communications Security Establishment (CSE).
  • This funding includes information management and information technology support services to the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG).
  • National Defence will continue to leverage CSE’s unique capabilities and expertise.

Line item: Transfer from CSE to Treasury Board Secretariat

  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is transferring $13.3K to the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) to support:
    • The Capacity Accelerator Project at the Office of the Comptroller General to support the public service audit community; and
    • Financial Community Developmental Programs and the Inclusion, Diversity, Equity and Accessibility initiative.

Line item: Transfer from CSE to Global Affairs Canada for staff posted at Canadian missions abroad

  • CSE’s 2021-22 Supplementary Estimates (C) include a transfer of $384.9K associated with various CSE liaison office positions in other countries for which GAC provides administrative support.
  • GAC is a common service provider for Government of Canada operations abroad and receives compensation for the increased cost of operations resulting from staff being posted at Canadian missions and liaison offices by other government departments.
  • This funding will help to ensure that our liaison offices can operate effectively.
 

CSE issue notes

CSE highlights of Minister of National Defence's mandate letter commitments

  • A safe and secure cyber space is critical for the security, stability and prosperity of Canada.
  • We know that the global cyber security threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Cyber incidents, including significant critical infrastructure incidents, are increasing in number and sophistication.
  • While the Government of Canada is equipped with the appropriate tools to respond to the challenge, there is a gap when it comes to this demand for the cyber security services of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) versus the resources we have available to respond to these challenges.
  • That is why in the Minister of National Defence’s (MND) mandate letter the Prime Minister specifically included the priorities of ensuring that CSE is in a position to lead the national response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources.
  • MND was also tasked with working with my colleagues, the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and other implicated ministers on the renewal of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
    • The renewed strategy will outline Canada's long-term plan to protect our national security and economy, deter cyber threat actors, and promote norms-based international behavior in cyberspace.
  • As outlined in MND’s mandate letter MND will also work to continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan.
    • This will help ensure that Canada is well positioned to address urgent and pressing cyber risks, and to ensure the security and integrity of Canada’s critical systems.

Details

Specific cyber mentions in MND's mandate letter
  • Oversee the Communications Security Establishment to ensure that they are in a position to lead Canada’s response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources and close cooperation with our allies.
  • Work with the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and in collaboration with implicated ministers, to develop and implement a renewed National Cyber Security Strategy, which will articulate Canada's long-term strategy to protect our national security and economy, deter cyber threat actors, and promote norms-based international behavior in cyberspace.
  • Working with the Minister of Public Safety, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and with the support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan, ensuring Canada is well positioned to adapt to and combat cyber risks, and ensure the security and integrity of Canada’s critical systems.

Foreign interference and the democratic process

  • The Government of Canada takes seriously its responsibility to protect Canadians from foreign interference, regardless of the source.
  • In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) worked together closely as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre also worked with Elections Canada to help secure election systems and infrastructure.
  • Our security and intelligence agencies coordinated integrated government efforts by raising awareness, monitoring, and reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy.
  • Now that the election has concluded, SITE Task Force partners will continue to work within their respective mandates to detect and counter possible foreign threats to Canada and its democratic institutions.
  • While Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient, CSE will continue to actively work to ensure their continued protection.

5G (Huawei)

  • We take the security of our country’s critical infrastructure very seriously. While we cannot comment on specific companies, the Government has been conducting an examination of emerging 5G technology and the associated security and economic considerations.
  • We continue to work with partners and other agencies to mitigate risks stemming from designated equipment and services, including Huawei, being used in Canadian 3G, 4G, and LTE telecommunications networks.

Ransomware

  • Ransomware has become an increasingly common and significant risk to government, businesses, and individuals.
  • The impact of ransomware can be extensive, and often includes core business disruptions, data loss and potentially significant recovery costs.
  • Ransomware remains a profitable activity for cybercriminals and therefore continues to pose a threat to Canada’s national security and economic prosperity.
  • I also know that the average ransom payment and frequency in which ransom attacks occur is increasing.
  • Paying a ransom not only funds criminal enterprises, it also enables further malicious cyber activity and ultimately there is no guarantee that cybercriminals will return stolen information.
  • The Government of Canada is working to reduce the threat of ransomware by targeting and disrupting cybercriminals, coordinating strategies with international allies and by issuing advice, guidance, and services for those affected by ransomware.
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act gives CSE the legal authority to conduct cyber operations to disrupt foreign-based threats to Canada, including cybercriminals.

Operation UNIFIER

  • The Government of Canada condemns Russia’s invasion, and the ongoing attacks in and around Ukraine and is steadfast in its support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.
  • To this end, on January 26th, 2022, the Government of Canada announced $340 million for immediate support to Ukraine and for the extension and expansion of Operation UNIFIER, Canada’s military training and capacity-building mission in Ukraine.
  • As part of this commitment, DND and CAF will work with CSE on measures to support enhanced intelligence cooperation, cyber security, and cyber operations.
    • This increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats.
  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities.
    • The CSE Act includes authorities that allow CSE to provide technical and operational assistance to DND and CAF in support of government-authorized military missions, such as Operation UNIFIER.
  • While I can’t speak about specific operations, I can confirm that CSE has been sharing valuable cyber threat intelligence with our partners in Ukraine.

Cyber security and recent cyber incidents

  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) continues to monitor the cyber threat environment, including cyber threat activity directed at critical infrastructure networks.
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre has alerted Canadian critical infrastructure operators to be aware of the risks, and has provided them with expert advice to mitigate against known Russian-backed cyber threat activity.
  • Now is the time for Canadian companies to take defensive action and be proactive in network monitoring and applying appropriate mitigations.
  • If Canadian companies have been impacted by cyber threats, they are urged to contact CSE’s Cyber Centre.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICoP) report

  • The Government faces a variety of sophisticated and unsophisticated cyber threats on a daily basis.
  • Cyber threat actors probe government systems and networks millions of times daily, looking for vulnerabilities, and these activities are becoming more frequent and more sophisticated.
  • CSE and our Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) work closely with Shared Services Canada (SSC) and other partners to ensure government networks and infrastructure are well defended against cyber threats.
  • Canadians can have confidence in our work and Canada’s security and intelligence community.

NSICoP report findings

  • We agree with the findings and recommendations of the NSICoP report and expect to extend advanced cyber defence services to all federal organizations to the greatest extent possible.

Details

Special Report on the Government of Canada’s Framework and Activities to Defend its Systems and Networks from Cyber Attack
  • The Special Report on the Government of Canada’s Framework and Activities to Defend its Systems and Networks from Cyber Attack was tabled in Parliament on February 14th, 2022.
  • The Special Report includes four findings and two recommendations to strengthen the government’s framework for defending government networks from cyber attacks and to extend that framework over federal government organizations as broadly as possible.
  • The Honourable David McGuinty, Chair of NSICoP, stated that “The report is the first of its kind in Canada. It aims to help the government strengthen its cyber defence framework and ensure that the government is well-protected against cyber threats in the future”.
  • The Special Report also commends the Government for:
    • Providing strategic direction: National Security Policy (2004); Cyber Security Strategy (2010); National Cyber Security Strategy (2018)
    • Making changes to the machinery of government as it relates to cyber security with the creation of Shared Services Canada (2011) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (2018).
    • Investing more than $6 billion in defending government networks from cyber attack between 2010 and 2021.
CSE specific mentions in recomendation two of Special Report
  • Recommendation two in this NSICOP report states: To the greatest extent possible, the government will extend advanced cyber defence services, notably Enterprise Internet Service of SSC and the cyber defence sensors of the CSE, to all federal organizations.
  • CSE is working with the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) and SSC to extend its cyber defence sensors to all federal organizations.
  • As Canada’s technical authority on cyber security, and the GC’s Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT), CSE and its Cyber Centre work closely with government partners that do not fall under SSC’s purview.
    • CSE regularly shares cyber security advice and guidance, mitigation, and operational updates with these government partners.
 

DND issue notes

Cyber capabilities

  • The Federal Government has been working to strengthen our national cyber resilience and help Canadians adopt cyber security best practices.
  • Every day, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) uses its sophisticated cyber and technical expertise to help identify, prepare for, and defend against threats to Canada's information systems and networks.
  • CSE's Canadian Centre for Cyber Security provides Canadians with expert advice and guidance, and leads the Government's response to cyber incidents.
  • As directed by Strong, Secure, Engaged, the Canadian Armed Forces is also building its cyber expertise, hardening its defences, and working together with CSE to conduct cyber operations that support the Government's objectives.
  • As always, cyber operations are conducted in accordance with the Charter, Canadian, and international law.

If pressed on cyber incidents from foreign actors:

  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and respond to potential threats, and to take measures to address and neutralize them when they occur.
  • CSE's cyber defence and incident response teams work 24/7 to identify compromises and alert potential victims within the Federal Government and Canadian critical infrastructure.
  • CSE's Cyber Centre has alerted Canadian critical infrastructure operators to be aware of the risks, and has provided them with expert advice to mitigate against known Russian-backed cyber threat activity.
  • Now is the time for Canadian companies to take defensive action and be proactive in network monitoring and applying appropriate mitigations.
  • If Canadian companies have been impacted by cyber threats, I urge them to contact CSE's Cyber Centre

Key facts

  • December 2021: Prime Minister issued Mandate Letters to Cabinet. Minister of National Defence's letter included commitments to:
    • Oversee the Communications Security Establishment to ensure that they are in a position to lead Canada's response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources and close cooperation with our allies;
    • Develop and implement a renewed National Cyber Security Strategy; and,
    • Continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan.
  • June 2021: Canada committed cyber capabilities to NATO to advance NATO mission goals and objectives, and promote resilience.
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act (the CSE Act) came into force in 2019, and introduced new authorities, such as the ability to conduct adtive and defensive cyber operations
    • The CSE Act also authorizes CSE to provide operational assistance to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in support of government-authorized missions.
  • The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) was formally stood up in 2018 and it:
    • Leads the Government of Canada's response to cyber incidents; and,
    • Provides expert advice, guidance, services, and support on cyber security operational matters.
  • 2018: Government released the National Cyber Security Strategy to bolster Canada's cyber security posture by focusing on three themes:
    • Security and resilience;
    • Cyber innovation; and,
    • Leadership and collaboration.
  • December 2021: the Prime Minister issued a mandate to renew the National Cyber Security Strategy.
  • January 2022: the Government of Canada extended and expanded Operation UNIFIER, Canada's military mission to support the security of Ukraine. Related to cyber:
    • The Canadian Armed Forces will work with the Communications Security Establishment on measures to support enhanced cyber security and cyber operations.
 

Additional supporting documents

2021-2022 Supplementary Estimates C page proofs - English (PDF, 329 KB)

2021-2022 Supplementary Estimates C page proofs - French (PDF, 319 KB)

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