House Standing Committee on National Defence Appearance, Chief, CSE – February 9

Table of contents

Appearance details

Date: Wednesday, February 9, 2022

Location: Meeting to be held hybrid and will be “in-camera”

Time: 3:30 – 5:30 p.m.

Appearing:

  • The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence
  • Shelly Bruce, Chief, Communications Security Establishment
  • Bill Matthews, Deputy Minister of National Defence
  • Gen Wayne D. Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces
  • Col Robin Holman, Acting Judge Advocate General, Office of the Judge Advocate Genral

Details: The goal of the briefing is for the Minister of National Defence to discuss her Mandate Letter and priorities to the Standing Committee on National Defence.

 

Minister of National Defence opening remarks

Speaker: MND
Event: Appearance at Standing Committee on National Defence
Date: Feb 9, 2022
Length: 1071 words – approx 8.5 min at 125 wpm
Themes: Culture Change, International Ops, Domestic Ops, State of the World

Introduction

Mr. Chair,

Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence,

Thank you inviting me to appear before you today, alongside:

  • General Wayne Eyre; Chief of the Defence Staff
  • Bill Matthews, Deputy Minister of National Defence
  • Colonel Rob Holman, Acting Judge Advocate General; and
  • Shelly Bruce, Chief of the Communications Security Establishment

In the four months since I was appointed Minister of National Defence, they have been invaluable sources of knowledge and insight into the state of the Department of National Defence and our Canadian Armed Forces.

Yes, we are facing significant challenges right now—domestic and global threats, and the need for lasting culture change across the organization.

But, uncertain times often foster the greatest change. I’m honoured to have been entrusted with this mandate during a pivotal moment in our institution’s history.

Today, I’ll provide an overview of our top Defence priorities as outlined in my mandate letter, and the work our organization is doing to set us up for success now, and in the decades to come.

Support for people

First and foremost, that work is about supporting our people.

Our success at home and abroad comes down to having an engaged and resilient workforce.

A workforce with the numbers to support and sustain our regular operations, and to step in during times of crisis.

Our Armed Forces members have done incredible work throughout the pandemic, but COVID-19 has had an impact on readiness and affected recruitment efforts.

That’s why General Eyre issued a directive for our military to undertake a substantial, forces-wide reconstitution program.

This program aims to restore activities and readiness that have been affected by the pandemic, while looking to the future to ensure we can meet evolving threats.

A key part of reconstitution is ensuring our workplace is safer, equitable, and more inclusive.

Last year’s launch of the Chief, Professional Conduct and Culture—or CPCC—supports these efforts.

CPCC is leading our much needed culture change reforms across the organization to ensure our people can serve in an environment free from harassment, discrimination, abuses of power, or other harms.

Their work complements Madame Arbour’s Independent Review into Defence Team policies and culture.

We look forward to receiving her final report later this year, and implementing her recommendations to help prevent and address sexual misconduct across our ranks.

We know a healthy workplace is essential to our success — for both our people and our missions at home and abroad.

If we want people to join and stay in our ranks, they need to feel safer, and well-respected.

To feel their health and wellbeing is paramount.

To feel supported in achieving excellence and making a real difference.

International missions

In today’s highly complex operating environment, their skill and dedication is more important than ever.

Many of our international allies and partners are facing very real threats from state-actors trying to undermine the rules-based international order.

We are all troubled by challenges to Ukraine’s safety and sovereignty due to Russia’s military buildup in and around their borders.

In the face of this aggression, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the people of Ukraine.

Since 2015, we’ve trained over 32,000 members of Ukraine’s Security Forces through Operation UNIFIER. We just extended this mission for another three years—to 2025—and doubled the maximum number of CAF members who can deploy, from 200 to 400, should that be required.

We’re also providing Ukraine with non-lethal equipment like body armour, metal detectors, binoculars, and laser rangefinders.

I was pleased to meet with Defence Minister Reznikov during my recent trip to Ukraine, and we’ll be working closely together to identify other areas where Canada can support.

Our work in Ukraine shows that Canada is always ready to help in times of crisis.

We also saw their dedication in action last year, during the height of the crisis in Afghanistan.

Throughout August, we worked 12 other countries to evacuate vulnerable Afghans and foreign nationals.

In total, Canada was able to transport, or help facilitate the transport of some 3,700 people out of the country, through Operation AEGIS.

And, elsewhere across the globe, we regularly deploy in solidarity with our partners and allies, including:

  • As part of the enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup in Latvia
  • In the middle east, through NATO Mission-Iraq
  • And, in the Indo-Pacific region, and West Africa, as part of Operation PROJECTION

In all of our missions around the world, we’re re-affirming our commitment to peace and stability in an uncertain time.

Domestic missions

Here at home, we’re also facing an unprecedented demand for military assistance.

Our Armed Forces have been involved in Canada’s COVID-19 response since the very beginning of the pandemic, helping out in hard-hit communities, and supporting vaccination efforts across the country.

More than 2300 Regular Force members, Reservists, and Canadian Rangers have stepped up.

At the same time, we’ve been called on to deploy personnel 8 unique times over the past two years in response to climate related disasters—which have increased in scope and severity over the previous decade.

Moreover, Canada is increasingly vulnerable to external threats that know no borders—including threats in domains like cyber and space.

These concurrent demands underscore just how important our military’s reconstitution efforts are.

Our fighting force must be ready to respond to a variety of different threats, from all directions, at all times—and in close cooperation with our closest allies.

That means having the right number of people in our ranks.

It means making sure they are included, respected and engaged.

And it means giving them the right equipment and training to match these threats.

We remain committed to achieving this vision and investing in our future—

By redoubling our recruitment efforts…
Building our capacity across all domains…
And ensuring our people have state of the art, fit-for-purpose equipment that can meet current and future threats.

Conclusion

Mr. Chair, our military is at an inflection point.

We’re facing significant demand for CAF support, both here at home and across the globe.

And we’re facing rapidly evolving threats that risk outpacing our defences and leaving Canadians vulnerable.

Our solutions must be built around people.

We need the right people, with the right training, and the right equipment.

And we need to create a culture that fosters their total health and wellbeing as they do the critical jobs we ask of them.

There’s a lot to do … but I’m confident that together, we will realize this vision.

I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you.

 
 

Standing committee on National Defence 44th Parliament, 1st session

 
Portrait - John Mckay
  • NDDN since 2021 (former NDDN member 2011-13)
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence
Key interests

National defence, human rights

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 1997; re-elected in 2015
Professional background
  • B.A. in Arts from the University of Toronto Scarborough
  • LL.B. from Queen’s University
  • Lawyer
Committee membership
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2021-)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2017 to 2021)
    • Chair, Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security
  • Former Vice-Chair on the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2013 to 2015)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2011 to 2013)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2015 to 2017)
  • Former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance (2003 to 2005)
  • Former Critic for National Defence (2011-2013), Environment (2013 to 2015), Industry (2008 to 2009), and Treasury Board (2006 to 2007)
  • Co-Chair of the Canada-US Interparliamentary Group (2021-)
  • Chair of the Canada-UK Interparliamentary Group (2020-)
  • Counsellor of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Canadian Branch of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2021-)
Points of interest to CSE
  • One of the few Government-side MPs who voted in favour of the CPC’s Opposition Motion in November 2020, which called on the Government to make a decision on the Huawei Ban
  • During SECU’s study of Bill C-59 asked what contributions the Bill would make to address cyber threats to private infrastructure
  • Public Safety Committee, December 2020: McKay expressed concern surrounding the lack of clarity for reporting cyber incidents for Canadians
Other interests
  • Human rights, trade, unions, law
 
 
Portrait - Kerry-Lynne D. Findlay
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Shadow Minister for National Defence
Key interests

CAF support, small businesses, law

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2011, re-elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Studied history, political science and law at the University of British Columbia
  • Completed advanced courses at Harvard Law School and Rotman’s School of Management in Toronto
  • Established a law practice in Vancouver
  • Established her own law firm, KFindlay Law Group, in 2019
  • Served as a BC appointee on the Delta Police Board
Committee membership
  • Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Special Committee on Afghanistan (2021-)
  • Vice-Chair of the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying (2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (2020 to 2021)
  • Vice-Chair and Member of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2020)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Shadow Minister for National Defence (2021-)
  • Shadow Minister for Environment and Climate Change (2019 to 2020)
  • Minister of National Revenue (2013 to 2015)
  • Associate Minister of National Defence (2013)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice (2011 to 2013)
  • Member on the: Canada-China Legislative Association (2021), Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association (2021), Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (2021), Canada-Unites States Interparliamentary Group (2021), Canada-United Kingdom Interparliamentary Association (2021), and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • At the Committee of the Whole (Supplementary Estimates B), Dec 2021: Posed a question to Minister Joly showing concern over Canada not being a part of the new Three Eyes Partnership with the US, UK and Australia.
  • COVID-19 Pandemic Committee, May 2020: Posed question showing concern over the government partnering with a Chinese company backed by the Chinese military to conduct research into COVID-19. Showed concern that the Chinese military has been accused of trying to hack research data by our own intelligence agencies.
Other interests
  • CAF/military support, small businesses, law
 
 
Portrait - Christine Normandin
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Law, immigration and refugees

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Obtained Bachelor’s of Science in Biomedical Sciences in 2006
  • Appointed lawyer in 2015, eventually specializing in international family law and child abduction
  • Sat on the Board of Directors of the École secondaire Marcellin-Champagnat and was president of the Bloc Québécois Political Commission
  • Named Volunteer of the Year 2018 by the Young Bar Association of Montreal for the hours she devoted to helping citizens prepare for their court hearings
Committee membership
  • Vice-Chair for the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Vice-Chair for the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (2020 to 2021)
  • Former Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) (2020)

Political and parliamentary roles

  • National Defence Critic for the Bloc Québécois (2021-)
  • Deputy House Leader of the Bloc Québécois (2019-)
  • Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Critic for the Bloc Québécois (2019 to 2021)
Points of interest to CSE
  • Canada-China Relations Committee, May 2021: Concerned over Canada’s “laxed” stance on Huawei in comparison to the other Five Eyes partners
  • Business of Supply- Government Orders, February 2021: Concern of China’s mass surveillance regime and the surveillance capacities of Huawei
Other interests
  • Law, immigration and refugees, international students
 
 
Portrait - Todd Doherty
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Veterans and CAF issues

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former aviation executive, serving as a top aviation business development professional
  • Promoted regional, provincial and national passenger, cargo and tourism opportunities
  • Small business owner
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Vice-Chair of Standing Committee on Procedural and House Affairs since 2020
    • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs
  • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure & Communities (2020)
  • Former Vice Chair of the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans (2017 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Deputy Shadow Minister for National Defence (2021-)
  • Special Advisor on Mental Health and Wellness in Shadow Cabinet (2020-)
  • Former Critic for Transport and Former Critic for Fisheries and Oceans
  • Member of the Parliamentary Associations of Canada-Europe, Canada-Africa, NATO, ParlAmericas, the Canada Group of Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the Inter-Parliamentary Groups of Canada-United States, Canada-Germany, Canada-Ireland, Canada-Israel, Canada-Italy, Canada-Japan and the Canada-China Legislative Association (2020)
Points of interest to CSE
  • CACN, 2020: Spoke on China-Canadian relations with respect to Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and a request to invite Ambassador Barton to appear before committee
Other interests
  • Championed Bill C-211, An Act Respecting a Federal Framework on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
  • At-risk youth, Crisis intervention, opioid crisis, mental health, veterans, CAF
 
Portrait - Darren Fisher
  • NDDN since 2016
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Seniors
Key interests

Economic development, National Pharmacare, CAN-NATO relations

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former small business owner and community volunteer
  • Elected to Halifax Regional Council in 2009 and 2012, and elected as Deputy Mayor in 2014
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-), and (2016 to 2019)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Health (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2017 to 2019)
  • Member of the House Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (2016 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Seniors (2021-)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Economic Development and Official Languages (2021)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health (2019 to 2021)
  • Counsellor for the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2020)
  • Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group and the Canada-United Kingdom Interparliamentary Association (2018 to 2019), and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • NDDN Committee, Briefing by the Commissioner of CSE, March 2017: Concern over other Five Eyes partners not keeping their promise to protect Canadian data and spy on each other’s citizens
  • NDDN Committee, Canada’s Involvement in NATO, January 2018: Concern over if Canadian and NATO infrastructure is safe from data breaches and if there is a quick response to new cyber threats
Other interests
  • Pharmacare, environmental issues, mental health, literacy and poverty
 
Portrait - Cheryl Gallant
  • NDDN since 2001
Key interests

Cyber security, Op IMPACT, BMD, CFB Petawawa is in her riding

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2000
Professional background
  • B.SC. in Chemistry from the University of Western Ontario
  • Chief Administrative Director for a family-owned small business/ professional practice
  • Chairperson of the City of Pembroke Downtown Development Commission
  • Member of the Economic Advisory Committee for Pembroke
  • Former researcher with the University of Toronto on biochemistry
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2006-)
    • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2016 to 2017)
    • Former Vice-Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2016 to 2017)
    • Former Member of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology (2014 to 2015)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former Deputy House Leader of the Official Opposition
  • Member of the Canada-China Legislative Association (2021)
  • Director of Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Shadow Cabinet Minister for Veterans Affairs and Economic Development Initiative for Northern Ontario (2019 to 2020)
  • Vice-Chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2006-)
  • Several Parliamentary Associations including Canada-China Legislative Association, Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, and Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly
Points of interest to CSE
  • E-security” is a popular topic for Gallant. Issues of greatest interest in this area include:
    • Cybersecurity of the electricity grid; NATO and NORAD and cybersecurity, including IoT and AI; recruiting cybersecurity experts into the military; how CSE works with the private sector; information sharing in the Five Eyes; Russian cyberattacks against Georgia
Other interests
  • Op IMPACT, CFB Petawawa is in her riding, Ballistic Missile Defence, peacekeeping
 
 
Portrait - Bryan May
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence
Key interests

Veterans affairs, community activism

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • BA, University of Waterloo
  • Senior management of various non-profit organizations
  • Executive Treasurer of the Social Planning Council of Cambridge and North Dumfries
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020 to 2021)
    • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Natural Resources (2020 to 2021)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (2015 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (2021-)
  • Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2018 to 19), Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2018 to 19), Canada-Ireland Interparliamentary Group (2018 to 19), Canada-China Legislative Association (2016 to 17), and others
Points of interest to cse
  • NIL
Other interests
  • Community activism, veterans affairs, Sponsor of Bill C-272, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act: C-272 gives a small amount of control back to the consumer and will allow provinces to create their own right-to-repair legislation. This bill completed its second reading in June 2021
 
Portrait - Glen Motz
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests
  • Seniors, gun control, health care, rural crime
Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2016 (by-election)
Professional background
  • Attended Hillcrest Christian College
  • Began a policing career with the Medicine Hat Police Service
  • Received several awards including the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Former Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) (2020)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2017-)
  • Former Member of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (2017)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Shadow Cabinet Minister for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Associate) (2019 to 20)
  • Former Member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Member of the Canadian Section of the ParlAmericas, Member of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group and several others (2017 to 2018)
Points of interest to cse
  • INDU, May 2020: CSE appearance
    • Interest in levels of fraud and the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre
    • Asked Scott Jones about front-line health workers being a target of fraud of cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic
    • Asked Scott Jones about intellectual property theft through cyberattacks and espionage
    • Interest in Chinese state-sponsored actors and foreign influenced activities
Other interests
  • Law enforcement, rural crime, seniors, gun control, health care
 
Portrait - Lindsay Mathyssen
  • NDDN since 2021
Key interests

Racial equality, affordable childcare, gender equality

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2019
Professional background
  • Studied English and Political Science at Queens University
  • Studied non-profit management at Western University
  • Worked in various assistant roles for four MPs over the past 11 years
  • Succeeding her mother, Irene Mathyssen, who is retiring after serving on Parliament Hill for 12 years
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
    • Member of Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on National Defence
  • Member of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women (2020 to 2021)
    • Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women (2020 to 2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (2020 to 2021)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Deputy Critic for Women and Gender Equality (2021-)
  • Critic for National Defence for the New Democratic Party (2021-)
  • NDP Deputy House Leader (2021-)
  • Member of the Executive on the Canadian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2020-)
  • Member of the Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group, Canadian Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2021-)
Points of interest to CSE
  • NIL
Other interests
  • Gender equality, affordable childcare, racial equality
 
 
Portrait - Jennifer O’connell
  • NDDN since 2021
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities
Key interests

Infrastructure investments, climate change, affordable childcare

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Studied Political Science at the University of Toronto
  • Worked at a law firm specializing in labour law
  • Served as a City Councillor, Regional Councillor and Deputy Mayor in Pickering
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Health (2021)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2021)
  • Member of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (2020 to 21)
  • Member of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Finance (2017 to 18)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Finance (2016 to 2018)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities (2021-)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health (2021)
  • Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance (2018 to 19)
  • Previously Member on Canada-Europe Parliamentary Association, Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, Canadian Delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • Question Period, May 2021: In relation to the two Chinese scientists fired at the Microbiology Laboratory, O’Connell gave assurance that Canada takes threats to research security and intellectual property very seriously
  • House Debate, Petitions, October 2020: Concern of Huawei telecommunications in Canada and how it will affect Canada’s relationship with the Five Eyes allies.
    • Also showed concern over Canada’s autonomy and the Chinese government having access to our intelligence through Huawei networks
Other interests
  • Affordable childcare, infrastructure investments, climate change
 
Portrait - Yves Robillard
  • NDDN since 2017
Key interests

Arctic security, NATO, Russia and Ukraine, veterans affairs

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Former teacher
  • Former Chief of Staff to the President of the National Assembly of Quebec
  • Former Commander in Squadron 21 of the RCAF Reserve
  • Former Chief of Personnel for the Air Cadet Camp of Bagotville Military Base
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2017-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Veterans Affairs (2020-)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs (2018-2019)
  • Former member of the Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities (2016 to 2018)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Former member of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association (2016 to 2019)
  • Former Member of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group (2017)
Points of interest to CSE
  • NDDN February 2019: During Chief Shelly Bruce’s appearance before NDDN asked about what CSE is doing to “protect our elections”
  • NDDN, November 2018: During Chief Shelly Bruce’s appearance before asked how CSE “will play a key role in the [Cyber Centre]”
  • NDDN March 2017: During OCSEC’s appearance asked about bilingualism at CSE
Other interests
  • In NDDN committee, he asked questions about Arctic security, Canada’s role in NATO, hybrid warfare, peacekeeping, and Russia’s actions in Ukraine
  • Indigenous affairs, international relations, seniors, veterans
 
 
Portrait - Sven Spengemann
  • NDDN since 2016
Key interests

Iraq, CAF. security, public safety, Cyber threat mitigation

Election to the House of Commons
  • First elected in 2015
Professional background
  • Obtained LL.B from Osgoode Hall Law School
  • Doctorate from Harvard Law School (SJD)
  • Worked as a Senior Policy Analyst in the Privy Council Office
  • Served as a senior UN official in Baghdad with the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq. In Iraq, he negotiated operational protocols with the US Coalition Forces to ensure operational, security and medical support for the UN Mission
  • Led a team of international and Iraqi experts to assist the Iraqi Parliament and Kurdistan Regional government with constitutional and legislative reforms
Committee membership
  • Member of the Standing Committee on National Defence (2021-)
  • Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2020-)
    • Chair of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Liaison (2021-)
  • Member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (2016 to 2019)
Political and parliamentary roles
  • Co-Chair of the Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association (2020-)
  • Member of the Executive on the Canadian Group of the Interparliamentary Union (2020-)
  • Member of the Canada-China Legislative Association, Canada-Germany Interparliamentary Group, Canada-Israel Interparliamentary Group, Canadian NATO ParliamentaryAssociation, Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, and others
Points of interest to CSE
  • In favour of Bill C-59 and spoke a great deal in April 2018 on clarifying the purpose and importance of the Bill to other members of Parliament
  • January 2019: Concern of financial cyber fraud and if there is anything else the government can do to examine more closely
  • Speaks multiple times on the importance of small businesses using the CCCS to develop good cyber infrastructure
  • September 2018: Asked multiple questions on the state on Russia-China relations and China’s geopolitical interests
  • May 2016: Question pertaining to CSE’s powers on gathering information with respect to an individual who holds dual citizenship
Other interests
  • Human rights, gender equality, UN missions, institutional design, China-Russia relations
 

Mandate

NDDN studies the legislation, activities and expenditures of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed forces. It also examines the domestic, continental, and international security environment.

Appearances

  • November 2, 2020: CSE appeared alongside the Minister of National Defence and other senior officials to speak on Main Estimates, 2020 to 2021
  • March 11, 2020: CSE appeared alongside the Minister of Defence and other senior officials to speak on Supplementary Estimates B, 2019 to 2020

Key studies

  • Notable activities/meetings:
    • Briefing by the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment (March 2017)
    • Briefing on the Ongoing Activities of the Communications Security Establishment (May 2016)
  • Studies in recent years:
    • addressing sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces
    • impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Canadian Armed Forces operations
    • diversity within the Canadian Armed Forces
    • Canada’s contributions to international peacekeeping
    • the Ukraine crisis

Previous meetings (current session)

Wednesday, December 15, 2021: Election of Chair

The Honorable John McKay (LPC) was elected Chair. The Honorable Kerry-Lynne D. Findlay (CPC) was elected first vice-chair; Christine Normandin (BQ) was elected second vice-chair.

 

Mandate letter

1. According to the Mandate Letter, is the Government of Canada equipped with the appropriate tools to respond to increased cyber threats?
  • In my mandate letter, the Prime Minister specifically included three cyber related priorities to respond to the evolving threat environment.
  • One of these priorities was ensuring that the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is in a position to lead the national response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources.
  • With adequate resources, CSE can reduce the threat, strengthen our cyber defences by raising the bar, and responding to and recovering from (fewer) incidents.
2. According to the Mandate Letter, what progress will be made on the National Cyber Security Strategy?
  • In the Mandate Letter, I was tasked with the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and other implicated ministers on the renewal of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
  • This renewed strategy will outline Canada’s long-term plan to protect our national security and economy, deter cyber threat actors, and promote nroms-based international behavior in cyberspace.
  • As outlined in the mandate letter, I will also work to continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan.
  • This will help ensure that Canada is well positioned to address urgent and pressing cyber risks, and to ensure the security and integrity of Canada’s critical systems.

Foreign interference

3. There have been allegations of foreign interference targeting Conservative Party of Canada candidates. What is being done to protect members of parliament?
  • During the 2021 election, the Government of Canada did not detect state sponsored foreign interference that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election, and that warranted public communication, as determined by the Panel under the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.
  • We are aware of such coverage, however, SITE and its members cannot disclose the precise nature of any of their investigations due to national security reasons.
  • The Government of Canada remains vigilant, thoroughly investigates potential matters of foreign interference, and will take proper action to address threats to Canada’s democratic institutions when and if required.
4. Has there been any observable change of cyber intrusions or attempts of intrusions due to the COVID-19 pandemic from foreign state-sponsored actors?
  • CSE continues to advise the government on cyber threats and incidents.
  • The bulk of malicious threat activity that CSE has observed during the COVID-19 pandemic continues to be criminal in nature, and CSE is working with the appropriate partners to address such activity. For example, CSE has issued alerts and cyber security advice about COVID-related phishing campaigns.
  • CSE assess that foreign intelligence agencies will almost certainly continue to use their cyber capabilities to pursue intelligence related to COVID-19 medical research and intellectual property. Intellectual property, especially related to vaccine development, treatments, COVID-19 testing, and medical devices such as ventilators or personal protective equipment (PPE), would offer public health, economic, and national security benefits.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.
5. Are Chinese or Russian state-sponsored actors attempting to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure?
  • CSE has assessed that state-sponsored programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea all pose threats to Canada.
  • CSE has also assessed that it’s very likely that state-sponsored actors are attempting to develop capabilities that could disrupt critical infrastructure, such as the supply of electricity.
  • These actors may also continue to target our critical infrastructure to collect information, position for future activity or intimidate.
  • But CSE assess it is unlikely that actors will use cyber activities to disrupt or harm critical infrastructure outside conflict scenarios.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.
6. Has there been an increase in commercial espionage against Canadian organizations from state-sponsored actors?
  • State-sponsored actors will certainly continue to conduct espionage against Canadian businesses, academic or governments to steal intellectual property or proprietary information.
  • State-sponsored cyber threat actors will continue to target intellectual property related to combatting COVID-19 in order to support their own domestic health responses or to profit from its illegal reproduction by their own firms.
  • Adopting cybersecurity best practices goes a long way to offsetting risks of exploitation by any cyber threat actor.
7. The National Cyber Threat Assessment points to state-sponsored activities of China and Russia, as well as a few other countries, specifically. What is CSE doing to protect Government of Canada networks from these threats?
  • CSE is the primary centralized voice and resource for senior leadership in Government on cyber security operational matters, including incident management, situational awareness, and technical advice and guidance.
  • CSE defends Government of Canada cyber systems, and respond to significant cyber security threats and incidents to reduce and mitigate harm to the Federal Government.
  • CSE is a central resource for Government of Canada departments in support of their roles within their sectors.

Cyber security

8. What support has CSE or its Cyber Centre provided to GAC in response to the recent cyber attacks on their network?
  • Government of Canada partners are working together in response to this recent cyber incident.
  • At this time, there is no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.
  • As this investigation is ongoing, I cannot comment further on the incident.
  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur.
9. What support has CSE provided to Newfoundland in response to the cyberattack?
  • CSE, and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, are working closely with Federal partners and Province of Newfoundland and Labrador authorities to assist with their cyber incident response.
  • Cyber Centre officials have been in contact with provincial authorities since the beginning and have offered incident support and mitigation services.
  • The RCMP has also confirmed they have initiated a criminal investigation that is drawing upon specialized units with expertise in cyber threats.
  • As this investigation is ongoing, I cannot comment further on the incident.

The National Cyber Threat Assessment report

10. What is the National Cyber Threat Assessment report? What information does it include?
  • On November 18, the Cyber Centre released the National Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2020, an update to its previous 2018 report.
  • The NCTA 2020 provides an update to the 2018 National Cyber Threat Assessment with an analysis of the interim years and forecasts looking ahead to 2022.
  • The key judgements in this report are based on reporting from multiple sources, including classified and unclassified information. The judgements are based on the Cyber Centre’s knowledge and expertise in cyber security and informed by CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate, which provides us with valuable insights on cyber threat activity around the world.
11. What are the primary concerns and observations made in the report?
  • The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 highlights 4 key observations:
    • First, cyber-crime is the most likely threat to impact Canadians now and in the years ahead;
    • Second, cybercriminals often succeed in their work because they exploit human and social behaviours;
    • Third, ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
    • Finally, while cybercrime is the main threat, state-sponsored cyber programs of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran pose a strategic threat to Canada.

Huawei 5G

12. Our Five Eyes partners have made decisions on Huawei and their 5G networks.. When will Canada make a decision on Huawei?
  • While we cannot comment on specific companies, the Government has been conducting an examination of emerging 5G technology and the associated security and economic considerations.
  • As the Prime Minister noted, there will be a decision on the 5G security review in the near future.
  • We continue to work with partners and other agencies to mitigate risks stemming from designated equipment and services, including Huawei, being used in Canadian 3G, 4G, and LTE telecommunication networks.
13. Does CSE have any concerns about the social media app Tik Tok or WeChat?
  • CSE's Cyber Centre is not a regulatory agency and as such does not endorse or ban social media applications.
  • It is important for Canadians to adopt good cyber security practices – which CSE shares on the cyber.gc.ca website.

CSE activities and COVID-19

14. What is the Government doing to counter misinformation about COVID-19?
  • Cyber threat actors are using fake websites, imitating health agencies or government departments, to spread disinformation or to defraud Canadians.
  • In response, CSE is helping to identify and take down these kinds of malicious websites.
  • In coordinately with industry partners, CSE has contributed to the removal of more than 10,000 fraudulent sites or email addresses, including those pretending to be the Public Health Agency and the Canada Revenue Agency.
  • CSE also continues to provide critical foreign intelligence to inform decisions on Canada’s approach to COVID-19.
15. Has CSE dealt with any compromises of our own research organizations?
  • CSE is aware of incidents of malicious threat activities directed at Canadian health research organizations and continues to offer cyber security support and sharing of threat related information to limit any potential impacts to targeted organizations.
  • CSE recommends that all Canadian health and research organizations remain vigilant and apply best practices in cyber security. Such practices include monitoring network logs, remaining alert to suspicious emails and calls, and keeping servers and critical systems patched for all known security vulnerabilities.
  • While CSE cannot speak on any specific incidents, CSE is working with Canadian health care and research sectors, and other partners and industries, as appropriate.
16. What has CSE done specifically to reduce the risks that Canadian research and development efforts could be compromised, specific points about what we are doing with Canadian universities, GC science departments, and the private sector?
  • CSE, in collaboration with CSIS, continues to engage with all of these entities to provide threat briefings. CSE, through the Cyber Centre, has published practical steps organizations can proactively take to protect themselves. These are all available online. This is in addition to alerts and advisories published regularly to draw attention to security vulnerabilities or issues.
  • Further, when CSE sees malign foreign cyber activities it have both alerted the victims and assisted with recovery but also, with its colleagues around government and its allies, publicly attributed this activity as seen this past year.
  • More recently we have been working with ISED to assess the cyber security posture for recipients of strategic innovation funds but it is important to note that all of the advice and guidance is publicly available for all Canadian organizations.

CSE general questions

17. How did the Communications Security Establishment Act change CSE’s authorities?
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act gave CSE new authorities which are needed to keep up with rapid advancements in technology. These new authorities enable CSE to work more effectively and proactively to protect Canada and Canadians.
  • CSE is now able, upon request, to deploy its cyber defence services to protect Canada’s critical infrastructure and other important systems designated by the Minister of National Defence as being of importance to the Government of Canada.
  • In addition, CSE is now authorized to undertake both defensive and active foreign cyber operations to help protect Canadians and Canada’s interests.
  • At the same time, CSE is also now subject to a strengthened oversight and accountability regime to ensure the privacy of Canadians.
18. What are the Cyber Centre’s responsibilities?
  • Created in 2018 as part of CSE, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security consolidates the key cyber security operational units of the Government of Canada under a single roof. As a unified source of expert advice and guidance, the Cyber Centre leads the Government’s response to cyber incidents.
  • The Cyber Centre also collaborates with the rest of government, the private sector and academia to strengthen Canada’s cyber resilience.
  • With the Cyber Centre, Canadians have a clear and trusted place to turn for cyber security.
 

Media lines

  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act (the CSE Act) sets out five aspects of our mandate: cyber security and information assurance; foreign intelligence; defensive cyber operations; active cyber operations; and technical and operation assistance. We use our technical expertise in all five aspects of our mandate. We do so to keep Canadians safe and secure
  • CSE’s foreign signals intelligence program provides Canada’s senior decision-makers with insights into the activities, motivations, capabilities, and intentions of foreign adversaries, and the international readiness and foreign reactions to a variety of diverse global events
  • CSE’s intelligence reporting also identifies hostile state activities, and the CSE Act authorizes us to assist the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
  • We support Canadian military operations and protect forces deployed abroad through advanced cyber techniques. For example, CSE could protect Canadian forces by disrupting an adversary’s ability to communicate or providing intelligence regarding an imminent threat
  • The CSE Act gives CSE the legal authority to conduct cyber operations to disrupt foreign-based threats to Canada. This includes active cyber operations to degrade, disrupt, respond to, or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of foreign individuals, states, and organizations
  • If there are reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign state or actor constitutes a threat to the security of Canada and/or Canadian military forces, we are prepared to take appropriate action to address the threat
  • We continue to provide the Government of Canada with the most comprehensive information available related to Canada’s intelligence priorities, directly furthering Canadian safety, security, and prosperity
 
  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities. The CSE Act includes authorities that allow us to provide technical and operational assistance to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)
  • CSE is authorized to assist the CAF in support of government-authorized military missions, such as Operation UNIFIER. This support includes intelligence sharing, cyber security, and cyber operations
  • While we can’t speak about specific operations, CSE can be counted to deliver on its mission working with Canada’s military presence in support of Ukraine
  • This increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats
 
  • Canada engages internationally to promote and protect a free, open, and secure cyberspace
  • The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day
  • Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information
  • CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) remain committed to working with domestic and international security and intelligence partners to maintain the open, reliable, and secure use of cyberspace
  • On Wednesday, January 19, 2022, CSE’s Cyber Centre published a cyber threat bulletin urging Canadian critical infrastructure operators to raise awareness and take mitigations against Russian-backed cyber threat activity
    • CSE’s most recent cyber security bulletin is a proactive advisory for Canadian critical infrastructure operators urging them to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive network monitoring and mitigations
    • It is further intended to raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology
  • The Cyber Centre published an Alert on January 17, 2022, outlining ‘Wiper malware’ being used to target Ukrainian organizations
If pressed on release date of threat bulletin and GAC cyber incident
  • Cyber threats are persistent. CSE issues security threat bulletins and cyber alerts on a regular basis. CSE's cyber security bulletin released on January 19th followed similar bulletins released by US and UK partners to understand and mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure.
CBC News - Anand meets with Ukraine’s defence minister as country braces for possible invasion

January 31, 2022

Defence Minister Anita Anand got an updated assessment of Ukraine's military needs during a meeting with the embattled country's defence minister Monday.

Ukraine appears to have given her a clear assessment of its needs. Anand said she needs to take that list back to cabinet.

"It would be prudent in light of the very intense and sensitive security situation at the current time to discuss that first with my counterparts in cabinet and with the prime minister," Anand said.

Anand said that, while she couldn't get into specifics, she and Reznikov "discussed cyber security in particular and how important it is to make sure cyber networks are secure."

The Ukrainian government was hit by a massive cyber attack recently. Canada's current aid package includes a promise to share with Ukraine the expertise of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada's signals intelligence and cybersecurity agency.

Global Affairs Canada also was hit by a massive cyber attack a week ago, while Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly was conducting a round of diplomacy in Ukraine. Federal officials have not pointed the finger at Russia or at Moscow-backed private hackers.

Anand, who is the minister responsible for CSE, wasn't prepared to assign blame when asked about it Monday, saying only that she remains concerned about Canada's cyber defences.

Toronto star – Ottawa debating sending more troops to eastern Europe and weapons to Ukraine

The Liberal government said it is weighing Ukraine’s request to send more money and weapons, and looking at deploying more troops to NATO operations in eastern Europe.

Defence Minister Anita Anand told reporters in Ukraine that “we are definitely considering the further support that we can provide in this area. Decisions are ongoing,” Anand said.

Anand told reporters cabinet is considering the request from Ukraine’s government for weapons. “The issue is not off the table,” she said. “We will continue to monitor the evolving and fluid situation and make decisions accordingly.” Anand underscored that Ukraine has recognized the importance of the Canadian training mission, and its leader Lieut.-Col. Luc Gilbert said “that Ukraine wants more of us.”

On Monday she said that her talks with Ukraine’s defence minister Oleksii Reznikov “discussed cyber security in particular, and how important it is to make sure that cyber networks are secure.”

Last week, Trudeau offered more intelligence and cyber support to Ukraine.

A spokesman for the foreign intelligence agency, Communications Security Establishment, said CSE “has unique technical and operational capabilities” and the legal authority to assist the Canadian Forces with “technical and operational assistance” in support of military missions such as Operation UNIFIER, the name given to the Ukraine mission.

This support includes intelligence sharing, cyber security, and cyber operations,” said CSE spokesman Evan Koronewski, declining to discuss specifics. “This increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats.

Opposition statements on Canada’s support to Ukraine

  • The Conservative Party of Canada continues to criticize Canada’s response to Ukraine’s call for aid. They argue that the government should be providing lethal weapons, and the contribution to date is inadequate. Opposition Leader Erin O’Toole has asked if Canada is a friend and ally of Ukraine and said the country is missing in action
  • New Democratic Party leader Jagmeet Singh opposed sending weapons to Ukraine, and focused on the humanitarian toll of Russia’s actions to date. Singh told the House of Commons that Canada should focus its efforts on diplomacy and “non-lethal assistance. Bloodshed must be avoided through international pressure and stronger sanctions.”
  • The Bloc Quebecois said Canada is doing nothing but “crying wolf” and not trying to directly engage with Russian President Vladirmir Putin

Cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada

  • On January 24th, the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they are working with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a recent cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC)
  • The cyber incident was detected on January 19, after which mitigation actions were taken
  • Critical services for Canadians through Global Affairs Canada are currently functioning. Access to a very limited number of internet-based services remain restricted as part of the mitigation measures and work to restore them continues
  • At this time, there is no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident
  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur
  • This investigation is ongoing. We are unable to comment further on any specific details for operational reasons
  • Our cyber defence and incident response teams work 24/7 to identify compromises and alert potential victims within the federal government and Canadian critical infrastructure. In the wake of a cyber incident, the incident response team offers advice and support to contain the threat and mitigate any potential harm
  • We are constantly reviewing measures to protect Canadians and our critical infrastructure from electronic threats, hacking, and cyber espionage. We encourage all government and non-government partners to use cyber security best practices

Draft statement - Update on GAC cyber incident

The Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), can confirm they continue to work with Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, in response to a recent cyber incident involving Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

Critical services for Canadians through Global Affairs Canada remained functional through mitigation efforts, and since our last statement nearly all GAC priority services have been restored. It is important to note that any GAC internet-based services that were impacted during the past week were a result of the mitigation efforts taken to resolve the incident, and were preventative in nature.

Equally important to note, there continues to be no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.

The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day.

Cyber threats can result from system or application vulnerabilities, or from deliberate, persistent, targeted attacks by outside actors to gain access to information.

We urge Canadians and Canadian organizations to remain vigilant and to visit Cyber.gc.ca and getcybersafe.gc.ca for tips on how to stay secure online.

Media reporting

National Post – Canada’s foreign affairs department targeted in significant cyber attack

January 24, 2022

Canada’s Foreign Affairs Department was the target of a significant cyber attack last week, on the same day the country’s cyber defence agency warned of Russian-backed cyber threats.

The federal government confirmed on Monday that it was responding to a “cyber incident” that was first detected on Jan. 19 targeting Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

The statement also confirmed that Canada’s digital defence and spy agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security is investigating the incident.

On the same evening the cyber attack on GAC was detected, CSE put out a threat bulletin warning Canadian organizations — particularly “critical infrastructure” providers — of the possibility of attacks from Russian-backed cyber threat actors.

“Canada’s Cyber Centre… is aware of foreign cyber threat activities, including by Russian-backed actors, to target Canadian critical infrastructure network operators, their operational and information technology,” the agency said.

The bulletin made no mention of an incident involving the Canadian government, and it is unclear if the warning had anything to do with the cyber attack targeting GAC.

A similar warning published by the U.S. in the same week warned of Russian-backed hackers trying to attack government organizations.

Global News – Global Affairs Canada suffers cyber attack amid Russia-Ukraine tensions: sources

January 24, 2022

Global Affairs Canada is scrambling to recover after a multi-day network disruption that security and government sources describe as a “cyber attack.”

While neither Global Affairs nor Canada’s cyber security agency, the Communications Security Establishment, could immediately comment, sources tell Global News the government is concerned the attack was conducted by Russia or Russian-backed hackers.

“GAC has been the target of a cyber attack but it is not clear if the Russians, the alleged perpetrators, hacked into the system or were able to merely disrupt its service,” a national security source, who spoke on the condition they not be named, told Global News.

Late Wednesday evening, the CSE published an updated cyber threat bulletin warning Canadian organizations to bolster their defences.

“(The CSE) is aware of foreign cyber threat activities, including by Russian-backed actors, to target Canadian critical infrastructure network operators, their operational and information technology,” the bulletin read.

When asked if the bulletin was issued in response to a spike in observed cyber-attacks, including by Russian-backed actors, a spokesperson for CSE told Global News they could not discuss the matter for “operational security reasons.”

But the CSE said the bulletin was partially an attempt to “raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology.”

It’s unlikely that Global Affairs missed the memo. The department works closely with the CSE, given the agency’s mandate to collect foreign intelligence and launch cyber attacks against foreign adversaries.

The CSE’s warning also referenced its assessment, made in 2021, that foreign-backed hackers have made incursions into Canadian critical infrastructure, manufacturing, health and energy networks. The agency assessed it unlikely that foreign states would attempt to disrupt those critical sectors “in the absence of international hostilities.”

 

CSE issue notes

CSE highlights of Minister of National Defence’s Mandate letter

  • A safe and secure cyber space is critical for the security, stability and prosperity of Canada
  • We know that the global cyber security threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Cyber incidents, including significant critical infrastructure incidents, are increasing in number and sophistication
  • The Government of Canada is equipped with the appropriate tools to respond to the challenge. There is a clear gap, particularly when it comes to this demand versus the resources we have available to respond to these challenges
  • That is why in my mandate letter the Prime Minister specifically included three cyber related priorities to respond to the evolving threat environment. One of these priorities was ensuring that the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is in a position to lead the national response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources
    • Every day, CSE uses its sophisticated cyber capabilities to identify and defend against threats to Canada’s information systems and networks
    • However, the number of incidents CSE is being called on to support and help recover from is increasing in frequency, severity and sophistication
    • To help address this growing challenge, CSE is working with Public Safety as well as other departments on a series of immediate policy and legislative initiatives to prevent cyberattacks, raise the bar for resilience, and manage current incidents
    • This work will also be done in close cooperation with our international allies
  • With adequate resources, CSE can reduce the threat, strengthen our cyber defences by raising the bar, and responding to and recovering from (fewer) incidents
  • I was also tasked with working with my colleagues, the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and other implicated ministers on the renewal of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
    • The renewed strategy will outline Canada's long-term plan to protect our national security and economy, deter cyber threat actors, and promote norms-based international behavior in cyberspace
  • As outlined in my mandate letter I will also work to continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan
    • This will help ensure that Canada is well positioned to address urgent and pressing cyber risks, and to ensure the security and integrity of Canada’s critical systems

Details

Background
  • For over 75 years, the CSE has been Canada’s national signals intelligence agency for foreign intelligence and the technical authority for cyber security and information assurance
  • CSE’s foreign signals intelligence program provides Canada’s senior decision-makers with insights into the activities, motivations, capabilities, and intentions of foreign adversaries, and the international readiness and foreign reactions to a variety of diverse global events
  • CSE’s sophisticated cyber and technical expertise helps identify, prepare for, and defend against the most severe and persistent cyber threats against Canada’s computer networks and systems
CSE’s mandate
  • The Communications Security Establishment Act (the CSE Act) sets out five aspects CSE’s mandate: cyber security and information assurance; foreign intelligence; defensive cyber operations; active cyber operations; and technical and operation assistance. We use our technical expertise in all five aspects of our mandate. We do so to keep Canadians safe and secure
Cyber threat environment
  • As outlined in the National Cyber Threat Assessment report (NCTA 2020), over the last two years the number of cyber threat actors is rising, and they are becoming more sophisticated
  • Cybercrime continues to be the cyber threat that is most likely to affect Canadians and Canadian organizations, and CSE’s Cyber Centre judges that ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers
  • Ransomware is the most common cyber threat Canadian’s face, and it is on the rise
  • The Government of Canada is working to reduce the threat of ransomware by targeting and disrupting cybercriminals, coordinating strategies with international allies and by issuing advice, guidance, and services for those affected by ransomware
Specific cyber mentions in MND’s mandate letter
  • Oversee the Communications Security Establishment to ensure that they are in a position to lead Canada’s response to rapidly evolving cyber risks and threats, including through adequate resources and close cooperation with our allies
  • Work with the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and in collaboration with implicated ministers, to develop and implement a renewed National Cyber Security Strategy, which will articulate Canada's long-term strategy to protect our national security and economy, deter cyber threat actors, and promote norms-based international behavior in cyberspace
  • Working with the Minister of Public Safety, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and with the support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, continue to advance the National Cyber Security Action Plan, ensuring Canada is well positioned to adapt to and combat cyber risks, and ensure the security and integrity of Canada’s critical systems
 

Foreign interference and the democratic process

  • CSE is Canada’s national lead for foreign signals intelligence and cyber operations, and the technical authority for cyber security. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) operates within CSE and protects the systems and information that Canadians rely on every day.
  • We continue to monitor for cyber threats through our foreign intelligence mission. We also work with allied and domestic partners to improve Canada’s cyber security and resilience.
  • In the lead up to and during the 2021 Federal Election, we worked closely with partners at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE).
  • CSE’s role in SITE was to monitor for foreign threats and interference with electoral processes in Canada.
  • Along with other security and intelligence agencies, we coordinated integrated government efforts by raising awareness, monitoring, reporting on threats, and providing advice to protect our democracy.
  • Now that the election has concluded, CSE and other SITE Task Force partners will continue to work within our respective mandates to detect and counter possible foreign threats to Canada and its democratic institutions.
  • We will continue to actively work to ensure Canada’s democratic institutions and processes are protected.

Details

Election 2021
  • Democratic institutions and processes around the world, including elections, are valuable targets for foreign interference. Canada is not immune to these threat activities. This is not new. As part of its plan to safeguard the 2019 federal election, the Government of Canada established the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol Panel) to ensure coherence and consistency in Canada’s approach to publicly informing Canadians during the writ period about incidents that threaten Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election. The Protocol, and its administration, was overseen by a panel of five senior civil servants who were responsible for determining whether the threshold for informing Canadians had been met, either through a single incident or through an accumulation of separate incidents.
  • In addition, the SITE Task Force, comprised of officials from the CSE, CSIS, the RCMP, and Global Affairs Canada, was established as a fully integrated team to help the Government assess and respond to foreign threats. Before and throughout the election, the SITE Task Force also provided security briefings to Elections Canada and Canadian political parties, to promote situational awareness and help them strengthen their security practices.
Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process report 2021 update
  • As outlined in CSE’s Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process (published July 2021), changes made around the world in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as moving parts of the democratic process online or incorporating new technology into the voting process, almost certainly increased the cyber threat surface of democratic processes. Most significantly, threat actors can harness and amplify false narratives related to the COVID-19 pandemic to decrease confidence in elections.
  • The Government of Canada, including CSE and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, remains vigilant in monitoring for any developing foreign threats, including those that may look to cause disruption with electoral processes in Canada.
 

5G (Huawei)

  • As part of its cyber security mandate, CSE works with telecommunications service providers representing over 99% of Canadian subscribers. In this role, CSE provides advice and guidance to mitigate supply chain risks in telecommunications infrastructures upon which Canadians rely, including, since 2013, a program that has been in place to test and evaluate designated equipment and services considered for use on Canadian 3G and 4G/LTE networks, including Huawei.
  • Third party labs accredited by CSE perform this testing. CSE’s role includes accrediting the third-party labs that perform this assurance testing and defining the testing requirements. CSE reviews the testing results and provides tailored advice and guidance to Canada’s telecommunications sector.
  • While non-disclosure and commercial confidence agreements limit the degree to which CSE can comment on specific details, Canadians can be assured that the Government of Canada is working to make sure that robust protections are in place to safeguard the communications systems that Canadian rely on.
  • The Minister of Public Safety’s Mandate letter states that legislation will be introduced to safeguard Canada’s critical infrastructure, including Canada’s 5G networks to preserve the integrity and security of our telecommunications systems.
  • On September 28, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that he hopes to share a decision on whether to ban Huawei technologies from Canada’s 5G wireless network rollout “in the coming weeks”.

Details

  • A CPC opposition motion was placed on the order paper about 5G (full text of motion below) December 6, 2021 — Ms. Dancho (Kildonan—St. Paul) — That, in the opinion of the House, the government should:
    • follow the advice of allied nations and immediately ban Huawei from Canada's future 5G network;
    • reassure the United States that Canada is dedicated to an integrated North American intelligence and defence network;
    • do everything in its power to counter espionage, enhance critical infrastructure protection, adapt to the modem cyber environment, and ensure that Canada's security network is infallible from both foreign and domestic threats; and commit to not paying compensation to telecommunications companies for the removal of Huawei's equipment from Canada's communication networks
 

Cyber attacks and critical infrastructure

  • Every day, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) uses its sophisticated cyber capabilities to identify and defend against threats to Canada’s information systems and networks.
  • CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security provides Canadians with expert advice and guidance and leads the Government’s operational response to cyber incidents.
  • In November 2020, the Cyber Centre released the National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 (NCTA 2020), which noted that it is likely that state-sponsored actors are attempting to develop capabilities that could disrupt critical infrastructure, such as the supply of electricity.
  • These actors may also target our critical infrastructure to collect information, position for future activity or to intimidate.
  • We continue to publish advice and guidance to help organizations be more secure. We work with industry partners, including government and non-government partners, to share threat information and cyber security best practices.

If pressed on Global Affairs Canada (GAC) incident

  • The Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they are working with Government of Canada partners, including CSE and our Cyber Centre, in response to this recent cyber incident.
  • As this investigation is ongoing, I cannot comment further on the incident.

Details

Threat landscape
  • As outlined in the National Cyber Threat Assessment report (NCTA 2020), over the last two years the number of cyber threat actors is rising, and they are becoming more sophisticated.
  • Cybercrime continues to be the cyber threat that is most likely to affect Canadians and Canadian organizations, and CSE’s Cyber Centre judges that ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
  • While cybercrime is the most likely threat, the state-sponsored programs of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose the greatest strategic threats to Canada.
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre noticed an increase in cyber threats during the course of the pandemic, including the threat of ransomware attacks on the country's front-line healthcare and medical research facilities. The Cyber Centre assesses that these threat actors will almost certainly continue using thematic lures for malicious phishing attempts, including COVID-19 and health-related themes.
Threat bulletin related to Russian-backed cyber threat activity
  • On January 19, 2022, CSE warned of Moscow-backed cyberattacks on Canadian critical infrastructure.
  • This was a proactive advisory for Canadian critical infrastructure operators urging them to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive network monitoring and mitigations. It is further intended to raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology.
Global affairs cyber incident
  • On January 19, 2022, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) was the target of cyber incident, which was a multi-day network disruption. At this time, there is no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.
  • On January 24th, the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they are working with Government of Canada partners, including the CSE and its Cyber Centre, in response to this recent cyber incident.
  • Critical Services for Canadians through GAC are currently functioning. Some access to Internet and Internet-based services are not currently available as a part of the mitigation measures and work is underway to restore them.
  • At this time, GAC, TBS and CSE have not said who they believe to be behind the attack.
 

Ransomware

  • As outlined in the National Cyber Threat Assessment report (NCTA 2020), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) observed over the last two years the number of cyber threat actors is rising and they are becoming more sophisticated.
  • Cybercrime continues to be the cyber threat that is most likely to affect Canadians and Canadian organizations, and CSE judges that ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
  • Ransomware has become an increasingly common and significant risk to government, businesses, and individuals.
  • The impact of ransomware can be extensive, and often includes core business disruptions, data loss and potentially significant recovery costs.
  • Ransomware remains a profitable activity for cybercriminals and therefore continues to pose a threat to Canada’s national security and economic prosperity.
  • Paying a ransom not only funds criminal enterprises, but it also enables further malicious cyber activity and ultimately there is no guarantee that cybercriminals will return stolen information.
  • CSE continues to publish advice and guidance to help organizations be more secure. CSE works with industry partners, including government and non-government partners, to share threat information and cyber security best practices.

Details

Ransomware
  • There are a variety of state and non-state threat actors responsible for different types of cyberattacks.
  • Ransomware attacks can be launched by any cyber threat actor for a variety of reasons, but primarily for financial motivation and/or cyber espionage. Ransomware is a cyber tool most commonly associated with cybercriminals.
  • Ransomware is the most common cyber threat Canadian’s face, and it is on the rise.
  • During a ransomware attack, cybercriminals use malicious software to encrypt, steal, or delete data, then demand a ransom payment to restore it.
  • Ransomware can have severe impacts including core business downtime, permanent data loss, intellectual property theft, privacy breaches, reputational damage, and expensive recovery costs.
  • Basic cyber security practices would prevent most ransomware incidents in Canada.
  • On 6 December 2021, the Government released advice and guidance on ransomware. It includes an open letter to businesses signed by four ministers, a new ransomware playbook for organizations' incident prevention and recovery, and an updated cyber threat bulletin.
  • CSE also confirmed to several media outlets that we have the legal authority to conduct cyber operations to disrupt foreign-based threats to Canada, including cybercriminals. The department confirmed we have the cyber tools we need to impose a cost on the people behind these kinds of incidents (ransomware), and we are using these tools for sure purposes.
  • We continue to work with Canadian law enforcement where appropriate against cybercrime.
The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020
  • The NCTA 2020 provides an update to the 2018 National Cyber Threat Assessment with an analysis of the interim years and forecasts ahead to 2022.
  • The key judgements in this report are based on reporting from multiple sources, including classified and unclassified information. The judgements are based on the Cyber Centre’s knowledge and expertise in cyber security and informed by CSE’s foreign intelligence mandate, which provides us with valuable insights on cyber threat activity around the world.
  • The National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 highlights several key observations:
    • First, cyber-crime is the most likely threat to impact Canadians now and in the years ahead and cybercriminals often succeed because they exploit human and social behaviours.
    • Second, ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
    • Finally, while cybercrime is the main threat, state-sponsored cyber programs of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran pose a strategic threat to Canada.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
  • As part of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) brings over 75 years of experience protecting Canada’s most sensitive information and networks. Bringing together operational security experts from across the Government of Canada, the Cyber Centre is the Government of Canada’s authority on cyber security.
  • Defending the Government of Canada’s information systems provides the Cyber Centre with a unique perspective to observe and analyze trends in the cyber threat environment.
  • Cyber security is a team sport and a whole of society concern. The Federal government demonstrates leadership, working closely with other government agencies, industry partners, and with the public to share knowledge and experience to improve cyber security for Canadians and to make Canada more resilient against cyber threats.
 

Operation UNIFIER (CSE lines)

  • The Government of Canada condemns Russia’s threats and military buildup in and around Ukraine and is steadfast in its support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.
  • To this end, on January 26th, 2022, the Government of Canada announced $340 million for immediate support to Ukraine and for the extension and expansion of Operation UNIFIER, Canada’s military training and capacity-building mission in Ukraine.
  • As part of this commitment, DND and CAF will work with CSE on measures to support enhanced intelligence cooperation, cyber security, and cyber operations.
    • this increased support will help Ukraine strengthen its security and ability to defend itself against a range of threats.
  • As Canada’s national cyber security and foreign intelligence agency, CSE has unique technical and operational capabilities.
    • The CSE Act includes authorities that allow CSE to provide technical and operational assistance to DND and CAF in support of government-authorized military missions, such as Operation UNIFIER.
    • CSE is authorized to assist the CAF in support of government-authorized military missions, such as Operation UNIFIER. This support includes intelligence sharing, cyber security, and cyber operations.
  • CSE can be counted on to deliver on its mission working with Canada’s military presence in support of Ukraine.
  • The Government of Canada is committed to working closely with Ukraine to enhance resilience and cyber security in the face of evolving cyber risks and threats.

Details

Operation UNIFIER
  • Operation UNIFIER is the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) military training and capacity-building mission to support the Security Forces of Ukraine.
    • The CAF launched Operation UNIFIER in 2015 in response to requests from the Government of Ukraine.
    • The training mission harmonizes its efforts with other nations through a Multinational Joint Commission. This commission includes Canada, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Denmark and Sweden.
  • On January 26th, 2022, the Government of Canada announced $340 million for immediate support to Ukraine and for the extension and expansion of Operation UNIFIER through to the end of March 2025.
    • As part of this commitment to Ukraine, an additional 60 troops will be deployed to Ukraine to join the approximately 200 CAF members already on the ground, with the ability to increase the total number to 400 CAF personnel.
    • The Department of National Defence and CAF will also work with the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) on measures to support enhanced intelligence cooperation and cyber security and cyber operations.
  • The extension of Canada’s support to the Ukraine through Operation UNIFIER delivers on the commitment outlined in the mandate letter issued to the Minister of National Defence by the Prime Minister on December 16, 2021.
 

Global Affairs Canada cyber incident

  • The Government of Canada deals with ongoing and persistent cyber risks and threats every day.
  • That is why we work with the federal government to strengthen our national cyber resilience and help Canadians adopt cyber security best practices.
  • The cyber incident that occurred at Global Affairs Canada was detected on January 19, after which mitigation actions were taken.
  • Government of Canada partners, including the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and its Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (the Cyber Centre), are working together in response to this recent cyber incident.
  • There are systems and tools in place to monitor, detect, and investigate potential threats, and to take active measures to address and neutralize them when they occur.
  • Our cyber defence and incident response teams work 24/7 to identify compromises and alert potential victims within the federal government and Canadian critical infrastructure.
  • As this investigation is ongoing, I cannot comment further on the incident.

Details

Global Affairs Canada cyber incident
  • On January 19, 2022, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) was the target of cyber incident, which was a multi-day network disruption. At this time, there is no indication that any other government departments have been impacted by this incident.
  • On January 24th, the Treasury Board Secretariat – Office of the Chief Information Officer (TBS-CIO), and Shared Services Canada (SSC), confirmed they are working with Government of Canada partners, including the CSE and its Cyber Centre, in response to this recent cyber incident.
  • Critical Services for Canadians through GAC are currently functioning. Some access to Internet and Internet-based services are not currently available as a part of the mitigation measures and work is underway to restore them.
  • At this time, GAC, TBS and CSE have not said who they believe to be behind the attack.
Threat bulletin related to Russian-backed cyber threat activity
  • On January 19, 2022, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) warned of Moscow-backed cyberattacks on Canadian critical infrastructure as Western countries prepare economic sanctions in the growing expectation that Russia will invade Ukraine.
  • CSE’s Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) released a cyber threat bulletin related to Russian-backed cyber threat activity.
  • This was a proactive advisory for Canadian critical infrastructure operators urging them to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive network monitoring and mitigations. It is further intended to raise awareness and draw further attention to known Russian-backed cyber threat activity, including the tactics, techniques and procedures used to target operational and information technology.
  • CSE’s Cyber Centre is aware of foreign cyber threat activities, including by Russian-backed actors, to target Canadian critical infrastructure network operators, their operational and information technology (OT/IT).
As mentioned in the National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 (NCTA 2020)
  • State-sponsored actors are very likely attempting to develop cyber capabilities to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure, such as the supply of electricity, to further their goals.
  • The assessment found that it is very unlikely, however, that cyber threat actors will intentionally seek to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure and cause major damage or loss of life in the absence of international hostilities.
  • Nevertheless, cyber threat actors may target critical Canadian organizations to collect information, pre-position for future activities, or as a form of intimidation.
 
 
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